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Abstract
The CPTPP, or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership, is an example of a “mega-regional” free trade agreement, whose provisions
on the rules of origin and trade facilitation can have potentially large impacts on
the CPTPP-wide supply chains. In this paper, we investigate whether the CPTPP
members are key upstream and downstream trade partners to each other in the global
value chains. We develop formulas of bilateral upstreamness and downstreamness,
based on the gross-export decomposition framework of Koopman, Wang and Wei (2014)
and Borin and Mancini (2017). We demonstrate how the decomposition of gross exports
can be used to construct informative measures of the position of countries in global
value chains.
Key Words: global value chain (GVC); gross export decomposition; upstream/downstream
trade partners; GVC position; CPTPP
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1 Introduction
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”)
is a free trade agreement (“FTA”) signed in 2018 among 11 countries: Japan, Singapore,
Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Chile
and Peru. This is by far the largest FTA formed after the Uruguay Round (1985–1994).
∗The data that support the findings of this study are openly available from OECD at
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/inter-country-input-output-tables.htm.
†Associate Professor, School of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singa-
pore 178903. Email: plchang@smu.edu.sg. Tel: +65-68280830. Fax: +65-68280833.
‡Ph.D. candidate, School of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore
178903. Email: ptbnguyen.2014@phdecons.smu.edu.sg.
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The initiative evolved from the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP) or
“P4”, among Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, New Zealand and Chile. In 2010, negotiations
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”’) were launched among the four TPSEP members,
Malaysia, Vietnam, Australia and Peru; the US, Canada and Mexico joined in 2012, and
Japan in 2013. Since its first proposal, 18 rounds of negotiations were held. However, in
January 2017 the US (with the change of administration) decided to withdraw from the
pending TPP agreement. After modifications in the terms and conditions, the agreement
was salvaged and concluded without the US in 2018 under the new name “CPTPP”.
Among its many high-standard provisions, the agreement’s provisions on rules of origin
and trade facilitation have potentially large impacts on business incentives to develop and
consolidate CPTPP-wide supply chains. In particular, the “full accumulation” provision
recognizes all value-added created/accumulated in the territory of the members in justifying
a good’s origin from the CPTPP territory, while a “self-certification system” allows firms
to self certify their goods’ origins, minimizing customs clearance time. These benefits, in
addition to the CPTPP’s broad tariff cuts, are likely to encourage greater fragmentation of
the manufacturing process among the member territories.
Much of the existing work related to the CPTPP has mainly focused on the welfare
impact of the agreement on member countries and nonmembers; see, for example, Li and
Whalley (2014) on China and Narayanan and Sharma (2016) on India. Although large-group
GVC studies (see De Backer and Miroudot, 2014; Kowalski et al., 2015; Antra`s and Chor,
2018; Wang et al., 2017) have included individual CPTPP countries in their analysis, none
of them focus on the CPTPP per se, and in particular, its grouping optimality.
In this paper, we evaluate how closely connected the CPTPP members were with one
another in the global value chain (GVC) before the formation of CPTPP. Is this an ideal
grouping in the sense that the members are key upstream or downstream trade partners to
each other? Would alternative groupings with the addition of some third countries enhance
the tightness and self-sufficiency of the network?
Using the most recent accounting framework to trace value-added trade embedded in
gross exports (Koopman, Wang and Wei, 2014; Borin and Mancini, 2017), we develop formula
of bilateral upstreamness and downstreamness to identify the key upstream and downstream
trade partners of each CPTPP country. These are further disaggregated by the source of the
value added (from the world, the CPTPP territories, or alternative groupings of interest) for
the upstreamness measure, and the final absorption destination of the value added (by the
world, the CPTPP markets, or others) for the downstreamness measure. We also construct
measures to characterize the position of each CPTPP country in global value chains, and how
they have moved upstream or downstream over the period of study. Through the analysis,
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we demonstrate how the proposed formula can be used to provide informative measures
on the GVC positions of countries and to draw comparisons across sectors, and different
origins/destinations of the value added.
1.1 Related Literature
In the last three decades, production processes have become increasingly fragmented in stages
and yet integrated across countries. Several case studies on the fragmentation of production
have been conducted for products such as Apple’s Ipod and notebook PCs (Dedrick, Krae-
mer and Linden, 2010), cars (Sturgeon, van Biesebroeck and Gereffi, 2008), and smartphones
(Ali-Yrkko¨ et al., 2011). Due to lower communication and trade costs, trade in intermediate
inputs has become prevalent. Inputs nowadays travel across multiple countries in various
production stages before reaching their final destination of consumption. According to Tim-
mer et al. (2014), foreign value-added share in output increased from 28% to 34% during
1995–2008 for 85% of the 560 product chains they studied. These developments pose chal-
lenges in measuring countries’ contributions to international production chains. Standard
trade statistics record the gross export flows, so the statistics “double count” the same value
added when intermediate inputs cross international borders more than once. Johnson (2014),
for example, characterizes the stylized facts on the discrepancies between gross exports and
production value added reported in national accounts. In Section 2, we review the datasets
and methodologies that have been developed in the recent literature to trace the value-added
trade across countries. The different components of value-added trade will form the basis of
our formula.
The rise of GVCs also raises the question of the specialization of countries and firms
in the global production network: How much does a country participate in the network?
Which sectors are relatively integrated with the GVC? Where is the position of a country
in the global supply chains? A recent body of work has proposed several measures of the
depth of integration and the position of a country and/or an industry in the GVC. The
seminal article by Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) introduced the vertical specialization (VS)
index. It measures the share of imported inputs in a country’s gross exports. The same
study also proposed another index (VS1) that measures the extent of a country’s exports
used as inputs in another country’s production of exports. Daudin, Riﬄart and Schweisguth
(2011) proposed a measure (VS1*) that further distinguishes the part of VS1 that returns
to the country of origin as final goods. Johnson and Noguera (2012), in contrast, focused on
value-added exports to measure a country’s domestic value added absorbed abroad via final
or intermediate goods exports. They then used the ratio of value-added exports to gross
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exports (“VAX ratio”) to summarize a country’s value-added content of trade. Koopman
et al. (2010) suggested yet another index combining the share of foreign inputs (upstream
links) and the share of local intermediate goods used in other countries’ exports (downstream
links). Finally, Borin and Mancini (2017), through their modification of the decomposition
of bilateral exports, provided a measure for value added that crosses national borders more
than once and hence a new way to calculate the share of GVC-related trade in gross exports.
In Section 3, we analyze the extent of GVC participation by the CPTPP countries based on
some of the above indicators, using the gross export decomposition carried out in Section 2.
In parallel, another branch of the literature studies the relative position of a country or
a sector within the GVC. Antra`s et al. (2012) and Fally (2012) suggested two GVC indices
that measure the upstreamness of a sector. A sector (country) is defined as being relatively
more upstream in the production chain if it is more distant from final demand (or if it sells
a disproportionate share of outputs to relatively upstream industries). On the other hand,
Miller and Temurshoev (2017) and Fally (2012) proposed two downstreamness indices, where
a sector (country) is considered to be relatively more downstream in the value chain if it is
located farther away from its source of value added (or if it buys a disproportionate share of
inputs from relatively downstream industries). All these measures basically take into account
the forward and backward linkages of input-output relationship across sectors and countries.
However, as noted by Antra`s and Chor (2018), the above upstreamness measure tends to
be positively correlated with the downstreamness measure (sectors that are considered more
upstream by the upstreamness measure also tend to be more downstream by the downstream-
ness measure). This suggests that these measures are not informative of the GVC position of
a country-sector.1 In Sections 4 and 5, we propose bilateral upstream/downstream measures
to identify the key downstream and upstream partners of the CPTPP countries. A country
can simultaneously be a key upstream and downstream partner of another country relative
to another trading partner (because the comparison is based on the volume of value-added
trade intermediated across trading partners). In Section 6, we then propose measures (that
are independent of gross export volume and hence scale-free) to characterize the absolute
position of a country in the GVC. Section 7 extends the analysis further to the sector level.
Studies related to CPTPP have mainly analyzed its potential welfare impacts (or those
of the TPP, its predecessor) based on computable general equilibrium model simulations (see
Gilbert, Furusawa and Scollay, 2018, for a survey).2 Some focus on individual countries, such
1Wang et al. (2017) suggested a modified GVC position index to circumvent this inconsistency problem.
The index is conceptually equivalent to the ratio of the upstreamness and the downstreamness measures
introduced above, although it focuses on the part of forward/backward linkages that are GVC-related trade
(and excludes purely domestic linkages and those due to traditional trade).
2Because CPTPP was only concluded in 2018, there are not sufficient data to conduct ex post analysis
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as Vietnam (Nguyen et al., 2015), New Zealand (Strutt, Minor and Rae, 2015), Japan (Lee
and Itakura, 2014), and the US (USITC, 2014; Thompson and Leister, 2015), while others
analyze the impact of the agreement on nonmembers that could have strong trade connections
with the bloc. These include, for example, China (Xin, 2014; Li and Whalley, 2014; Lu,
2015), India (Narayanan and Sharma, 2016), Korea (Petri, 2016; Roh and Oh, 2016), and
Brazil (Thorstensen and Ferraz, 2014). There are, however, no systematic studies of the
supply-chain relationships of the CPTPP countries in the literature. This paper contributes
to the GVC literature and policy analysis of CPTPP in this regard.
2 ICIO Tables and Accounting Framework
2.1 ICIO Tables
To track input-output linkages on a global scale, datasets known as Inter-Country Input-
Output (ICIO) tables have been developed in recent years. These tables are combined
from a variety of sources including national accounts, country-level input-output tables, and
standard trade statistics. National input-output tables are harmonized and reconciled with
bilateral trade data in goods and services by end-use category. While country-wise input-
output tables are available at disaggregated levels and for an extended period, most global
input-output tables have been constructed at a level of aggregation higher than available
in primary sources and cover only the post-1990 period (some only for certain benchmark
years) (Johnson, 2018).
At present, there are six major ICIO tables. These are: Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP), World Input-Output Database (WIOD), OECD-WTO TiVA Database, Eora Multi-
Region Input-Output Table (MRIO), IDE-JETRO Asian Input-Output Table, and EX-
IOBASE Multi-Regional Environmentally Extended Supply and Use / Input Output (MR
EE SUT/IOT) database.3
For our analysis, we use the OECD-WTO TiVA Database (2016 edition). The tables
cover 63 economies (and one ROW) in 34 sectors for the period 1995–2011.4 All 11 CPTPP
countries are included in the database. The methodology and assumptions underlying the
construction of the OECD ICIO tables are provided in details in OECD-WTO (2012).
of the agreement.
3GTAP: www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu. WIOD: www.wiod.org. OECD-WTO TiVA: oe.cd/tiva. Eora
MRIO: worldmrio.com. IDE-JETRO: www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Io. EXIOBASE: www.exiobase.eu.
4Available at https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/inter-country-input-output-tables.htm. The 2018 edition
of the TiVA database covers the period 2005–2015, with one more economy, and is based on the
industrial list of ISIC Rev.4 with 36 sectors (instead of Rev.3). More details are provided at
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/measuring-trade-in-value-added.htm.
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2.2 Gross Export Decomposition Framework
In addition to the construction of input-output tables, new methods have been developed to
account for gross trade flows. Koopman, Wang and Wei (2014) (hereafter KWW) provide a
useful accounting framework to decompose a country’s aggregate gross exports into domes-
tic value added (DVA), foreign value added (FVA) and pure double-counting components.
Borin and Mancini (2017) (hereafter BM) further provide accounting frameworks for such
decomposition with respect to each trading partner and sector.5
As highlighted by Nagengast and Stehrer (2016), decomposition of a country’s bilateral
gross exports (instead of aggregate gross exports as in KWW) requires one to clearly identify
the bilateral export flow that a value-added component is assigned to, and the other bilateral
export flows where the component is labeled as purely double counted (DC) from the world
GDP perspective, if the value-added component crosses country borders several times. The
assignment rule depends on whether one takes the source-based or the sink-based approach.
In the source-based approach, a domestic value-added (DVA) component is attached
to the bilateral gross exports the first time the value-added component leaves the country
of origin (and is labeled as double-counted for the subsequent times it leaves the country
of origin). On the other hand, the sink-based approach attaches a domestic value-added
component to the bilateral gross exports the last time the value-added component leaves the
country of origin. For example, if a value-added component originates from Singapore, is
shipped to China, returns to Singapore, and is further shipped to Malaysia before reaching
the US as a final destination, the Singapore value added would be considered by the source-
based approach to be DVA in Singapore’s gross exports to China and domestic double-
counted (DDC) in Singapore’s gross exports to Malaysia. The assignment is reversed if one
adopts the sink-based approach.
In parallel, in the source-based approach, a foreign value-added component is attached
to the bilateral gross exports the first time the value-added component is re-exported (and
is labeled as double-counted for the subsequent times it crosses other country borders). On
the other hand, the sink-based approach attaches a foreign value-added component to the
bilateral gross exports the last time the value-added component is re-exported. Using the
example above, the Singapore value-added component would be considered by the source-
based approach to be FVA in China’s gross exports to Singapore and foreign double-counted
5In particular, the KWW framework decomposes a country’s aggregate gross exports by source and des-
tination of embedded value added, into nine components (of DVA FVA, or purely double-counted terms).
This is further generalized by the literature (e.g., Wang, Wei and Zhu, 2013) to bilateral and sector-level
trade. Most recently, Borin and Mancini (2017) refined the KWW method using the two distinct perspec-
tives of Nagengast and Stehrer (2016) while correcting some value-added assignments in the original KWW
decomposition.
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(FDC) in Malaysia’s gross exports to the US. In contrast, it would be labeled by the sink-
based approach to be FVA in Malaysia’s gross exports to the US, but FDC in China’s gross
exports to Singapore.
The choice obviously will affect the relative decomposition of value-added and double-
counted components (domestic or foreign) in a country’s bilateral exports (e.g., Singapore
to China, or Singapore to Malaysia). It will also affect the decomposition of FVA and FDC
(although not the DVA and DDC) of a country’s aggregate exports (e.g., Singapore to the
world). For example, a more upstream exporting country may be assigned another country’s
VA as FVA in its gross exports more often in the source-based approach and less often in the
sink-based approach. The two approaches are equivalent only at the world exports level (as
in either approach, a VA is only accounted for once in a certain trade flow and considered
double counted in all other trade flows).
In this paper, we take the BM source-based approach, because our proposed formulas
require information on bilateral value-added trade. Since it traces the value-added flows that
cross country borders for the first time, the source-based approach will also help identify the
value-added flows that cross country borders only once (thus associated with traditional
trade) and other value-added flows (that cross country borders more than once and hence
can be regarded as GVC-related trade).
We repeat the BM source-based decomposition framework below for easy reference. Sup-
pose the world consists of N countries and G sectors. Define Ysr to be the demand vector of
final goods produced in country s and consumed in country r (of dimension G×1). Let A be
the global matrix of input coefficients (of dimension NG×NG), so that B ≡ (I−A)−1 is the
global Leontief inverse matrix. In addition, let Vs denote the value-added shares embedded
in each unit of gross outputs produced by country s (of dimension 1×G), Esr the vector of
bilateral gross exports from country s to country r (of dimension G × 1), and uG a 1 × G
unit row vector.
The source-based approach decomposes the bilateral exports between country s and coun-
try r into domestic value added (component 1∗ to 5∗), domestic double counted (component
6∗), foreign value added (components 7∗ to 9b∗), and foreign double counted (components
9c∗ and 9d∗) as follows:
uGEsr =
1a∗
Vs(I−Ass)−1Ysr
+ Vs(I−Ass)−1Asr(I−Arr)−1

1b∗
N∑
j 6=r
ArjBjsYsr +
1c∗
N∑
j 6=r
Arj
N∑
k 6=s,r
BjsYsk

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+ Vs(I−Ass)−1Asr(I−Arr)−1
 2a∗Yrr +
2b∗
N∑
j 6=r
ArjBjrYrr +
2c∗
N∑
j 6=r
Arj
N∑
k 6=s,r
BjkYkk

+ Vs(I−Ass)−1Asr(I−Arr)−1

3a∗
N∑
j 6=s,r
Yrj +
3b∗
N∑
j 6=r
Arj
N∑
l 6=s,r
BjrYrl
+
3c∗
N∑
j 6=r
Arj
N∑
k 6=s,r
BjkYkr +
3d∗
N∑
j 6=r
Arj
N∑
k 6=s,r,l
N∑
l 6=s,r
BjkYkl

+ Vs(I−Ass)−1Asr(I−Arr)−1
 4a∗Yrs +
4b∗
N∑
j 6=r
ArjBjrYrs +
4c∗
N∑
j 6=r
Arj
N∑
k 6=s,r
BjkYks

+
5∗
Vs(I−Ass)−1Asr(I−Arr)−1
N∑
j 6=r
ArjBjsYss
+
6∗
Vs(I−Ass)−1
N∑
t6=s
AstBtsEsr
+
N∑
t6=s
Vt(I−Att)−1Ats(I−Ass)−1
[
7∗
Ysr +
8∗
Asr(I−Arr)−1Yrr
]
+
9a∗
N∑
t6=s
Vt(I−Att)−1Ats(I−Ass)−1Asr(I−Arr)−1
N∑
j 6=r
Yrj
+
9b∗
N∑
t6=s
Vt(I−Att)−1Ats(I−Ass)−1Asr(I−Arr)−1
N∑
j 6=r
Arj
N∑
k
N∑
l
BjkYkl
+
N∑
t6=s
Vt(I−Att)−1

9c∗
N∑
j 6=t,s
AtjBjsEsr +
9d∗
Ats(I−Ass)−1
N∑
t6=s
AstBtsEsr
 , (1)
where (i) Bts is the country-t to country-s section in the global Leontief matrix B, which
corresponds to the total input requirement from each sector of country t to produce one
unit of final demand in each sector of country s, and (ii) Asr is the country-s to country-r
section in the inter-country input coefficient matrix A, which corresponds to the direct input
requirement from each sector of country s to produce a unit of gross output in each sector
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of country r. Given that the source-based approach targets the first time a DVA leaves its
country of origin or the first time a FVA is re-exported, it uses the local Leontief matrix
(I−Ass)−1, pre-multiplied by the value-added share vector Vs. At the same time, it allows
for all possible forward linkages by which such VA components can be routed (including
repeatedly through the same country of origin or the same re-exporter), as captured by the
global Leontief matrix B before the final demand vector Y.
Table 1 provides a summary of the interpretation of each term in equation (1). In short,
this framework decomposes bilateral gross exports from country s to country r into DVA
and FVA (and by where they are ultimately absorbed). The DVA can be embodied in either
final goods or intermediate goods exports that are (i) absorbed directly in bilateral importers,
(ii) absorbed in bilateral importers after further processing stages in other countries, (iii)
absorbed by third countries, and (iv) reflected and absorbed at home. On the other hand,
the FVA can be embedded in exports by s of final goods and of intermediate inputs directly
absorbed by the importing country r, or in intermediate goods exports to r that are further
processed and re-exported by the importing country r.
3 GVC Participation
We begin the analysis by characterizing the extent to which the CPTPP countries partici-
pated in the global value chains. Did they develop more backward linkages and/or forward
linkages over the years of study 1995–2011? And how do the pattern and trend differ across
the member countries?
We first use the V S (vertical specialization) index of Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001),
which measures the fraction of imported inputs used in a country’s gross exports. With the
decomposition framework developed by KWW and BM, one can trace precisely the foreign
contents embodied in trade flows. We thus use the fraction of foreign contents (foreign value
added and foreign double counted) in a country’s gross exports as the revised V S indicator.
The larger the fraction of such foreign contents, the more a country sources internationally
in its production of gross exports (and, loosely speaking, the more backward linkages it has).
We then use the measure GV CKWW suggested by Koopman et al. (2010). In addition to
foreign contents, it further adds the domestic contents in gross exports that are not absorbed
by bilateral importers. This includes domestic contents in gross exports that are absorbed
by third countries (after further processing in bilateral importing countries) and that return
home and are absorbed by the exporting country itself. Thus, in a sense, it takes into account
both backward (upstream) linkages and forward (downstream) linkages in the consideration
of a country’s involvement in global value chains.
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Finally, Borin and Mancini (2017) further added to the above the domestic contents in
gross exports that are absorbed by bilateral importers but only after additional processing
stages abroad. In other words, they isolated the domestic value-added components that
cross country borders only once (and are directly absorbed by bilateral importers) and re-
gard them as “traditional trade”. This corresponds to components 1a∗ and 2a∗ in the BM
decomposition. A country’s gross exports net of these two components are then regarded as
its GVC-related trade flows.
Using the decomposition framework by BM, we calculate the three indices as below with
reference to Table 1:
V Ss =
∑
r 6=s
(7∗sr + 8
∗
sr + 9
∗
sr)/Es∗ , (2)
GV CKWWs =
∑
r 6=s
(1c∗sr + 2c
∗
sr + 3a
∗
sr + 3b
∗
sr + 3d
∗
sr + 4
∗
sr + 5
∗
sr + 6
∗
sr + 7
∗
sr + 8
∗
sr + 9
∗
sr)/Es∗ ,(3)
GV CBMs =
∑
r 6=s
[Es∗ − (1a∗sr + 2a∗sr)]/Es∗ , (4)
where Es∗ is the aggregate gross exports of country s. The V S index, by construct, is a
subset of the GV CKWW indicator, which is further a subset of the GV CBM index. Thus,
the magnitude increases as we use a more broadly defined measure of GVC.
Strictly speaking, the GV CKWWs index was proposed in the KWW accounting framework,
a sink-based framework. By using the global Leontief matrix in calculating the value-added
content VsBss instead of the local Leontief matrix Vs(I − Ass)−1 as in equation (1), it
confounds domestic contents with all potential backward linkages and hence is not a clean
way to isolate GVC-related trade. Its decompositions are also not exact in terms of the
destinations where a certain value added is absorbed. We thus take the BM accounting
framework and identify the right components to be used in (3) that are consistent with the
spirit of the GV CKWWs index.
Table 2 reports the three GVC measures for the CPTPP countries in four benchmark
years (1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011). We also add China, the US, and the world as reference
points. In terms of the V S index, Japan and Brunei were among the lowest. Although
Japan’s V S gradually increased over the period (from 5.61% to 14.66%), Brunei’s remained
low and decreased (7.26% to 4.26%). Japan thus integrated more foreign inputs in its
production of exports over the years. Despite their low degrees of vertical integration in
terms of backward linkages, the two countries had equally high degrees of GVC participation
as many other CPTPP countries (40.47% for Japan and 34.8% for Brunei in 2011 by the
GV CBM measure). This suggests that they participated in the GVC more via downstream
linkages (contributing contents to be used in further processing and integrated in other
10
countries’ exports). Countries with such similar profiles include Peru, Australia, and the
US. In particular, the US had low levels of V S (yet higher than Japan) and became more
involved in the GVC in the last two decades. Nonetheless, the pace of its increase was
relatively slow compared to the world average.
In contrast to the countries above, Singapore and Malaysia had the highest V S index.
Their gross exports consisted of 40–50% foreign contents across the years. Domestic contents
other than those directly absorbed by bilateral importers contributed another 10–15% of
gross exports. These countries thus had intensive backward linkages (but proportionally less
intense forward linkages) in their international production networks. Countries with such
similar profiles include Vietnam, China and Mexico.
Figure 1 illustrates the global value chain participation of CPTPP countries together
with China and the US across the years. The extent of GVC trade increased for all CPTPP
countries. In 1995, the average percentage of GVC participation across all CPTPP countries
was 32.88% of total gross exports. This number increased by 10 percentage points by 2011.
The GVC trend tended to slow down after 2000 for Singapore, Malaysia and China. In
contrast, Vietnam grew steadily in its GVC participation (from 33.55% in 1995 to 48.70% in
2011). Although Singapore and Malaysia remained at the top (57% and 56% respectively in
2011) in GVC participation, Vietnam overtook Mexico in 2005 and became the third among
the CPTPP countries.
Besides Vietnam, Japan, Chile and Peru also experienced fast growth in their GVC
integration during the period. For example, Japan’s GVC trade increased from 25.5% in
1995 to 40.5% in 2011 (close to a 15 percentage point increase). In contrast, countries such
as Canada, New Zealand and Singapore experienced a much smaller increase. Among the
CPTPP members, Singapore had the highest level of GVC trade in the 1990s, and Singapore
used to have a big lead. However, its unique status was diluted over the years as the other
countries gradually caught up in their GVC involvement.
4 Key Downstream Partners
In this section, we introduce our formula of bilateral downstreamness and use it to identify
the key downstream partners of each CPTPP member country. Intuitively, the formula
measures how much of a country’s domestic content (domestic value added and domestic
double counted) in all its gross exports is intermediated by a bilateral importer. The formula
can be further refined to focus on specific destinations where such domestic content is finally
absorbed.
For this purpose, we define DCGsr as the domestic content of country s in the gross
11
exports of country s to r that is finally absorbed in the set G of destinations. The bilateral
downstreamness of country r to s is defined as:
DGsr =
DCGsr − 1[r ∈ G](1a∗sr + 2a∗sr)∑
c{DCGsc − 1[c ∈ G](1a∗sc + 2a∗sc)}
(5)
where 1[·] is an indicator function that takes value of 1 if the importer is part of the final
destination market. The measure excludes the exporter’s domestic content that is directly
absorbed by the bilateral importer (1a∗sr + 2a
∗
sr), since it crosses country borders only once
(and hence is not associated with GVC trade). The numerator in (5) represents domestic
contents of s that are further exported by the bilateral importer r. A country r is considered
to be a more important downstream partner to country s than a country r′ (with respect to
the subset of domestic content that is finally absorbed by destinations in G) if a larger share
of exporter s’s domestic content (absorbed in G) is intermediated by r than r′.
Table 3 reports the key downstream partners of the CPTPP members in 2011. We
consider five regions of destination markets: the world, the CPTPP, the CPTPP with the
US, the CPTPP with China, and the CPTPP with China and the US. The first row reports
the relative shares of these markets in a country’s gross exports. On average, the CPTPP
countries sent 25% of their gross exports to the CPTPP market. The CPTPP market was
most important to Brunei (59.83% of its gross exports) and least to Canada (7.3%), Japan
(9.75%) and Mexico (10.4%). Except for Japan, the CPTPP market was important for all
members in Asia and Australasia (typically more than 20% of their gross exports). When
China was included as a destination, the shares rose above 35% for most countries (with the
exception of Canada and Mexico). On the other hand, when the US was included instead,
the importance of the destination market increased substantially for Canada (74.05%) and
Mexico (80.06%).
We then calculate, for each exporting country and destination market, the domestic con-
tent (DC) that is directly absorbed by the bilateral importer (if it belongs to the destination
market under consideration). These amounts of traditional trade are excluded from the
calculation of bilateral downstreamness as indicated in equation (5). We then rank each
country’s bilateral importers by the share of GVC trade intermediated by the importer,
for the DC destined for each of the markets, and highlight the top five downstream trade
partners.
We find that in 2011, China was the most important downstream partner for seven out
of eleven countries in the CPTPP (Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Australia, Chile,
and Peru). Of the domestic content of these countries not directly absorbed by bilateral
importers, 20–35% was intermediated by China. Its importance tends to increase when the
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destination is restricted to the CPTPP markets or the CPTPP plus the US markets. China
was also among the top three downstream partners of all CPTPP members — with the
exception of Brunei — illustrating China’s role as the world’s assembly factory. The other
important downstream partners of the CPTPP countries in 2011 included members such as
Japan and Singapore, but also nonmembers such as Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The latter
three regularly ranked among the top five downstream trade partners of the CPTPP coun-
tries. This highlights the important omission of these countries from the CPTPP grouping
and the potential benefits they may bring to consolidate the CPTPP-wide supply networks.
As expected, the US was the most important downstream trade partner of Mexico and
Canada. It intermediated more than half of these countries’ domestic contents related to
GVC trade, leading the second most important downstream partner (China for Canada
and Canada for Mexico) by a large margin of approximately 45 percentage points. When
restricting the focus to the CPTPP markets for final absorption, the importance of the US
as an intermediary only strengthens. This could be due to the fact that the CPTPP includes
four countries in the Americas, and the US is geographically proximate to these destinations.
Interestingly, China was not among the top five downstream partners of Brunei. Instead,
Korea was the most important downstream partner of Brunei in 2011 (followed by Australia,
Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam). This remains the case even when the final absorption
market is restricted to CPTPP or CPTPP augmented with the US or China. One possible
explanation is that Brunei’s main exports were primary commodities (such as metal products,
non-metallic mineral products, and basic metals). These sectors are relatively upstream and
hence likely take a longer route through the GVC before reaching the place of final demand.
Thus, countries that specialize in manufacturing assembly such as China may play a less
significant role in Brunei’s immediate downstream connections.
Geography appears to have affected downstream partner selection to some extent. For
example, Australia was the most important downstream partner of New Zealand, and the
US was of Canada and Mexico. Similarly, countries that are part of CPTPP or located close
to the CPTPP countries became more prominent as downstream partners for DC destined
to the CPTPP markets. For instance, in the case of Mexico, Canada was its second most
important downstream partner for the world market, followed by China, Spain, and ROW.
However, for the CPTPP market, China and Korea became relatively more important and
ranked as the second and fourth leading downstream partners of Mexico.
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5 Key Upstream Partners
In this section, we identify the key upstream trade partners for each CPTPP member and
for value added originating from a specified group of countries (such as the world or the
CPTPP region). From an importing country’s perspective, another country is an important
upstream trade partner in the GVC network if the country passes on a large amount of
foreign contents from third countries to the importer for absorption or for further processing
before being exported again. Formally, we define the bilateral upstreamness of country s to
country r as:
UGsr =
FCG◦sr − 1[r ∈ G]FCrsr∑
c{FCG◦cr − 1[r ∈ G]FCrcr}
(6)
where FCG◦sr measures all foreign contents originating from the countries in group G that
are embedded in bilateral exports from country s to country r. It corresponds to the sum
of components 7∗–9∗ in Table 1 across all countries t 6= s in group G. This includes the
foreign contents absorbed in r (components 7∗–8∗) but also those re-exported by country r
and absorbed in third countries (component 9∗). We exclude the importer r’s content in
country s’s gross exports to r since it is not clear in this case which country is upstream (or
downstream) in relation to the other. As a result, the numerator of (6) corresponds to the
GVC-trade in which exporter s passes on third countries’ contents to r. A country s with a
higher value of UGsr than country s
′ is regarded as a more important upstream trade partner
of country r since it passes on a larger portion of third-country contents to the importer r
among all third-country contents that r receives in its imports.
Table 4 summarizes the results for 2011, with each column corresponding to a specified
source of contents (G in our formula). First, the CPTPP countries imported 10.33–41.71%
of their goods/services from each other. Brunei was the smallest importer (with a gross
value of US$4.2 billion in 2011) but had the highest share of imports from the region. For
the CPTPP countries in the Americas (Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru), imports from the
CPTPP were around 10–15% of each country’s total imports. For the members in Asia, the
proportion was substantially higher, with an average of about 26%. When the US and China
are included as a source of imports, the shares increase significantly to around 50% for all
countries (with the exception of Singapore). The US was in particular an essential source of
imports for Canada and Mexico: the share increases from 10% to 60% when the source of
imports is expanded from the CPTPP region to include the US.
Next, in calculating (6), we exclude the importer’s contents embedded in its bilateral
gross imports. For most of the CPTPP countries, the importer’s own content embedded in
its gross imports was negligible (at less than 1%, not reported in the table). Canada, Mexico
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and Japan were on the high side, with 1.1–2% for the corresponding figures. The ranking of
bilateral upstream partners by the index UGsr in equation (6) indicates that China was the
most important upstream partner of Japan, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Chile and
Peru. In particular, for Japan and Vietnam, more than 25% of third-country contents they
imported were intermediated by China. A majority (65%) of these third-country contents
imported from China by Japan was absorbed in Japan (with 35% being re-exported again).
In contrast, a majority (52%) of the third-country contents imported from China by Vietnam
was re-exported after further processing in Vietnam. Thus, China played two distinct roles
as an upstream partner: one as the world assembly factory for goods close to final demand as
indicated in the previous section, and the other as the intermediary of intermediate inputs in
the GVC. Invariably, China ranked among the top five upstream partners of all the CPTPP
countries.
The US, on the other hand, was the most important upstream partner of Canada and
Mexico, and also had a significant role as upstream partner of Chile and Peru. Singapore
was the most important upstream partner of Malaysia and Brunei, while Singapore itself
had a very diversified set of upstream partners with a low concentration at the top. Korea
is a nonmember that stands out as a major upstream trade partner of CPTPP members,
even for the Latin American countries. Taiwan and Thailand were similarly two important
nonmembers that were critical upstream partners of several CPTPP countries.
When the source of content is restricted to the narrowest grouping of the CPTPP coun-
tries, typically Asian countries replaced European countries as important upstream partners
(such as Thailand versus the UK for Brunei, Korea/Taiwan versus the UK/Germany for
Canada, Taiwan/Malaysia versus Germany/Canada for Mexico, and Japan versus Germany
for Chile). When the source of contents is restricted to the CPTPP plus the US or China (or
both), the set (and the ranking) of key upstream partners for each of the members remains
very similar to the case of the world. This reflects the importance of the US or China in
world GDP (and their valued added in the GVC).
As noted from the analysis above, many countries were simultaneously important up-
stream and downstream trade partners of the CPTPP countries. This to some extent reflects
the relative size of trade volumes across countries. A large trading country (such as China)
will tend to intermediate large amounts of intermediate inputs from and to other countries,
relative to a country with small trade volume (such as Brunei). Nonetheless, bilateral dis-
tance and underlying production technologies still play a role, as suggested by the close
linkages among the American countries, and the minor role China played in Brunei’s GVC
linkages. In Section 7, we look at the bilateral supply chain relationships at the sector level,
which reveal some interesting heterogeneous patterns of upstream-downstream relationships
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across sectors (which might reflect the influence of trade cost and production technologies
to different extents).
In the appendix, we discuss potential generalizations of the bilateral downstream/upstream
indices, which encompass a larger set of gross-export decomposition components. The com-
parison of the narrow and broad indices will provide extra insights into the bilateral link-
ages across countries. But as will be shown, the general conclusions on the key down-
stream/upstream partners remain similar.
6 Position in Global Value Chains
In this section, we ask a slightly different question. Instead of ranking trading partners
in terms of the intermediate inputs they intermediate for a country, we evaluate for each
country the relative importance of different segments of GVC trade it engages in. In so
doing, the measure neutralizes the impact of economic size (which played a significant role
in the bilateral downstreamness/upstreamness measures), since the different segments of
GVC trade are normalized relative to gross exports. The resulting measures characterize the
absolute position (downstreamness) of the countries under study. We explore two potential
indicators.
First, based on the BM decomposition, we examine the fraction of domestic content
directly absorbed by bilateral importers, i.e., the amount of traditional trade (TTs∗), relative
to domestic content (DCs∗) in a country’s gross exports. This fraction is basically denoted
by:
D1s ≡ TTs∗
DCs∗
=
1−GV CBMs
1− V Ss , (7)
where in the last term, the numerator is the fraction of domestic content directly absorbed by
bilateral importers in gross exports and the denominator is the fraction of domestic content in
gross exports. We can regard this as an index of a country’s closeness to final demands or the
downstreamness of a country in the supply chains. The results are summarized in Figure 2
for 2011. We find that more than half of domestic content from the CPTPP countries was
directly absorbed by their bilateral importers, ranging from 68.10% for Brunei to 84.53% for
New Zealand. The levels were however quite similar across CPTPP countries, and also close
to the world average. Thus, it is not a very informative measure of downstreamness.
Next, we look at the fraction of foreign content in a country’s total amount of GVC-
related gross exports, that is:
D2s ≡ FCs∗
FCs∗ + DCs∗ − TTs∗ =
V Ss
GV CBMs
, (8)
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where FCs∗ and DCs∗ are respectively the foreign content and domestic content in country
s’s total gross exports. A larger D2s implies that a larger fraction of GVC-related exports of
country s is contributed by foreign contents and less by domestic contents. In other words,
the country has more backward linkages relative to forward linkages; hence, the country is
positioned relatively downstream in the global value chains.
The results for this index are reported in Table 5 for two benchmark years, 1995 and
2011. In 1995, Singapore, Mexico, Canada, Malaysia and Vietnam were located relatively
downstream in the global value chains (similar to China), while Japan, Brunei, Peru and
Australia were the opposite (in the same league as the US). Between 1995 and 2011, countries
such as Brunei, Peru and Australia moved even more upstream, while Japan became more
downstream. Vietnam experienced the biggest changes, and became the most downstream
country among the group in 2011. Malaysia similarly moved further downstream, although
less dramatically than Vietnam.
Relative to CPTPP countries, China’s position was relatively downstream in 1995, with
its D2s index only second to Singapore’s. However, it moved upstream in the chains over
the years (even though it was still on the relatively downstream side). The US, on the other
hand, moved downstream. Thus, the two large trading blocs became closer competitors in
their GVC positions.
7 CPTPP and Global Value Chains at Sector Levels
In this section, we characterize the GVC participation of the CPTPP countries at the sector
level. We disaggregate the bilateral gross exports of a country s by sector of exports. In
equation (1), we define B˜cc ≡ (I − Acc)−1 for c = s, t. Recall that it is the local Leontief
matrix of country c. The decomposition of equation (1) by sector of exports is obtained by
expanding VcB˜cc (a 1×G vector) to a G×G diagonal matrix with each element of VcB˜cc
placed along the principal diagonal and zeros elsewhere.
7.1 GVC Participation
Given the sectoral disaggregation, we calculate the GVC participation index GV CBM as in
equation (4) for each export sector. For example, component 1a* of country s’s exports of
electronics includes country s’s DVA from all its domestic sectors embodied in electronics
exports (as s’s final goods) directly absorbed by the bilateral importer r. Similarly, compo-
nent 2a* of country s’s exports of electronics includes country s’s DVA from all its domestic
sectors embodied in electronics exports (as intermediate inputs for further processing in the
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bilateral importer) and absorbed by the bilateral importer as r’s local final goods/services.
The remaining components consist of country s’s domestic contents embedded in country s’s
exports of electronics not directly absorbed by bilateral importers, and also foreign contents
in s’s exports of electronics. The resulting GV CBM index measures how much of country
s’s electronics exports are associated with GVC trade.
The results are presented in Table 6. For each country, we highlight sectors whose percent-
ages of GVC-related trade in gross exports exceed the country’s in the aggregate, where the
country’s overall GVC participation is as indicated in Table 2 under the column GV CBM . We
note that manufacturing sectors in CPTPP countries were deeply intertwined in the global
value chains. Basic metals was a particularly GVC-intensive sector for most countries in the
group, with the lowest level for Mexico (46.99%) and the highest for Singapore (81.78%).
This is against a world average of 64.00%. The other industries typically involved in GVC
of CPTPP countries included computer, electronic and optical equipment, fabricated metal
products, rubber and plastics, chemicals and chemical products. Coke, refined petroleum
products and nuclear fuel was a GVC-active sector in some CPTPP countries such as Japan,
Singapore, Vietnam and Chile. On the other hand, Canada, Mexico and the US were char-
acterized with a very high level of GVC trade in motor vehicles (65.50%–53.26%), relative
to a world average of 49.64%.
The service sectors of CTPPP countries in general were not heavily engaged in GVC.
Nonetheless, R&D and other business activities, and financial intermediation were two service
industries that appeared to be highly GVC-intensive for some countries. For instance, New
Zealand had 44.03% of financial intermediation and 38.59% of R&D activities associated with
GVC. The corresponding figures were 43.93% and 49.07% for Malaysia, 45.41% and 54.24%
for Singapore, and 50.52% and 53.19% for Vietnam. In comparison, the world averages
of GVC trade were 37% for financial intermediation and 42.71% for R&D. Thus, all these
countries stood out in terms of GVC participation in the sector of financial intermediation,
but the three Southeast Asian countries stood out even more in the sector of R&D and other
business activities. It is also noteworthy that Mexico’s construction sector (51.28%) and
Chile’s transport and storage services (50%) were prominent in their GVC participation,
against the world benchmarks of 29.79% and 39.97% respectively.
7.2 Upstream/Downstream Partners
We now select five sectors that are GVC-intensive (as analyzed above) and identify the key
upstream/downstream partners for the CPTPP countries in each of these sectors. These in-
clude rubber and plastics products (Sector 9), basic metals (Sector 11), computer, electronic
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and optical equipment (Sector 14), electrical machinery and apparatus, nec (Sector 15), and
motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (Sector 16). This exercise provides a more com-
prehensive understanding of the supply chain relationship across countries in GVC-intensive
sectors. Tables 7 and 8 summarize the results. The ranking is based on the world as the
final destination of contents for the downstreamness measure and the world as the source of
contents for the upstreamness measure.
Overall, in 2011 China was a critical partner for most CPTPP countries, especially in
computers and electrical machinery. Next to China, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand also played
important downstream intermediary roles for several CPTPP countries in these two indus-
tries. The four countries together also played significant downstream intermediary roles in
rubber and plastics products, and in basic metals, for CPTPP countries in Asia.
Nonetheless, Tables 7 and 8 indicate there are substantial heterogeneities across sectors
in bilateral GVC linkages. For example, China was a dominant downstream partner of Japan
in computers and electrical machinery, but this status was replaced by the US in Japan’s
car exports. Similarly, the dominance of China and Malaysia as downstream partners of
Singapore in computers and electrical machinery was replaced by Indonesia and ROW in
the car industry. Thailand and Japan were, respectively, Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s most
important downstream partners in the car industry.
The US was an essential downstream partner of Canada and Mexico in all five industries,
with the US intermediating typically more than half of their GVC-related domestic contents.
This is especially pronounced in Canada’s car exports, with 87.24% of Canada’s domestic
contents in forward linkages intermediated by the US. There are, however, exceptions. In
the computer industry, China intermediated equally large amounts (nearly 30%) of Canada’s
domestic contents as the US in forward linkages. In addition to the big two, European
countries such as Germany, Norway, Hungary and the UK were often among the top five
downstream partners of Canada. On the other hand, Chile and Peru had more diversified
and regional forward linkages.
In turn Table 8 shows that in sectors of rubber/plastics, computers, and electrical machin-
ery, the set of top five upstream trade partners often overlapped with those of downstream
partners. However, for heavy items such as basic metals and cars, this was less the case. For
example, in basic metals, Thailand and Malaysia were key downstream partners of Japan
(but not its key upstream partners), while Russia and South Africa were key upstream
partners of Japan (but not the other way around). Similarly, in the car industry, Russia
was among the top five downstream partners of Japan (but not upstream), while Germany
topped the list of Japan’s upstream partners (but not downstream). Thus, the direction of
the GVC in these two industries had a more defined pattern of upstream-downstream rela-
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tionships. This is likely due to the higher transportation cost involved in these industries,
and as a result, lower frequencies of back-and-forth shipping across countries in production
arrangements.
While China still was a dominant upstream partner to most CPTPP countries in most
sectors, Germany clearly stood out as a key upstream partner of all in the car industry (except
Chile and Peru). For example, it transferred 25–26% of third-country contents to Singapore
and Japan. Thailand (and Taiwan to a lesser extent) also played an important upstream role
in the rubber and plastics industry for CPTPP countries, with their joint share sometimes
rivaling that of China. Finally, Taiwan and Korea were prominent upstream partners in the
computer industry (next to China), while Japan and Germany were non-negligible upstream
players in the sector of basic metals.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, by decomposing a country’s gross exports a` la Koopman, Wang and Wei (2014)
and Borin and Mancini (2017), we propose formulas that measure the relative importance
of bilateral trading partners in intermediating a country’s backward and forward linkages.
By exploiting the relative proportion of foreign contents and domestic contents in a coun-
try’s GVC-related gross exports, we also suggest a GVC-positioning index that measures a
country’s absolute downstreamness in the global production network. These formulas and
indices can be further generalized to the sector level and/or with respect to a subset of
market destinations for absorption or countries of origin of contents.
We apply these measures to study whether the grouping of CPTPP countries is ideal in
the sense that members are important downstream/upstream partners of one another. Given
their dominant economy sizes, we also analyze the interaction of China and the US with the
CPTPP countries in the GVC. We find that the CPTPP countries were deeply integrated in
the global value chains with strong dependence on one another. In 2011, at least one third of
every country’s gross exports was associated with GVC trade. Among the eleven countries,
Singapore had the highest level of GVC trade (57.26%) and Brunei the lowest (34.80%). Of
their GVC-related gross exports, countries such as Singapore had a dominant proportion
made up of foreign contents (41.59% out of 57.26%), while others such as Japan had a
large fraction consisting of domestic contents that are further processed and embedded in
other countries’ gross exports. Such differences show that CPTPP countries such as Japan
(as well as Brunei, Peru and Australia) were located relatively upstream, while countries
such as Singapore (and similarly, Mexico, Malaysia and Vietnam) were located relatively
downstream in the global value chains. Relative to CPTPP countries, China’s position was
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relatively downstream in 1995, only second to Singapore. However, it moved upstream in
the chains over the years (even though it was still on the relatively downstream side). The
US (in the same league as Japan in 1995), on the other hand, moved downstream. Thus,
the two large trading blocs became closer competitors in their GVC positions.
China and the US, although not part of the partnership, were often among the top five
downstream and upstream partners of CPTPP countries. The US played a particularly
important role for Canada and Mexico, for both intermediating their domestic contents
to final absorption destinations as well as transferring third-country contents to these two
countries for absorption or for further processing. China, on the other hand, was a critical
downstream and upstream partner of CPTPP members in Asia but also in South America.
Relative to Canada and Mexico, the other CPTPP members had more diversified forward
and backward linkages across trading partners. The linkages were typically strong among
Asian/Australasian CPTPP members and less so across the Pacific. Nonmembers such
as Korea, Taiwan and Thailand stood out as dominant downstream and upstream trade
partners of many CPTPP countries. Their omission from the partnership thus implies some
potential ramifications on the re-alignment of the supply chains in the region.
Relative to CPTPP’s high levels of participation in GVC trade in the aggregate, several
manufacturing and service sectors of these countries were even more involved in the global
value chains. These included rubber and plastics products, basic metals, computer, elec-
tronic and optical equipment in manufacturing, as well as R&D, construction, and financial
intermediation in services. Leading upstream and downstream partners at the sector level
exhibited more fundamental heterogeneities across industries compared to those at the ag-
gregate trade level. While China continued to play a dominant intermediary role in both
downstream and upstream linkages in computers and electrical machinery, sectors character-
ized by high trade cost such as cars typically had distinct sets of key downstream partners
from upstream partners. The set of important trade partners were also more diversified at
the sector levels, with European and South American countries also playing significant roles
in different sectors for different CPTPP members.
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Appendix
A.1 Alternative measures of bilateral downstreamness and up-
streamness
In this section, we propose an augmented version of the bilateral downstreamness formula in
(5) and also for the bilateral upstreamness formula in (6). To identify the key downstream
trade partners, we have taken a local GDP perspective in (5) and examined how much of
local content is intermediated by a bilateral importer in forward linkage in the GVC. We can
argue that a bilateral importer r can also be considered an important downstream partner
of country s if it receives a lot of third country contents embedded in exports of country
s to country r for absorption locally or for further processing before being exported again.
With this taken into account, the augmented bilateral downstream formula instead takes the
following form:
D˜Gsr =
FC◦Gsr − FCrGsr + (DCGsr − 1[r ∈ G](1a∗sr + 2a∗sr))∑
c{FC◦Gsc − FCcGsc + (DCGsc − 1[c ∈ G](1a∗sc + 2a∗sc))}
(9)
where FC◦Gsr is the foreign content embedded in the gross exports of country s to country
r absorbed in destinations G, FCrGsr is the content of country r re-exported by country s to
country r absorbed in destinations G, DCGsr is the domestic content of country s in gross
exports of s to r absorbed in destinations G, and (1a∗sr + 2a∗sr) is the domestic content
of country s directly absorbed by bilateral importer r. A bilateral importer r is a more
important downstream partner to country s than importer r′ if country r receives a larger
portion of third country contents from country s or intermediates a larger portion of exporter
s’s domestic content to third countries than does importer r′.
Similarly, we can augment the bilateral upstreamness formula of country s to country r
in (6) as:
U˜Gsr =
FCG◦sr − 1[r ∈ G]FCrsr + 1[s ∈ G](DCsr − (1a∗sr + 2a∗sr))∑
c{FCG◦cr − 1[r ∈ G]FCrcr + 1[c ∈ G](DCcr − (1a∗cr + 2a∗cr))}
(10)
where FCG◦sr is the foreign content originating from countries in G that are passed on by
country s to country r, FCrsr is the importer r’s content re-exported by country s, DCsr
is the domestic content of country s in its exports to r, and (1a∗sr + 2a
∗
sr) is the content of
country s directly absorbed by bilateral importer r. The first part of (10) corresponds to the
GVC-trade in which the exporter s passes on third countries’ contents to r, while the second
part in (10) accounts for the exporter’s content that is further processed and re-exported by
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r. A country s is regarded as a more important upstream trade partner of country r than
country s′ if country s passes on a larger portion of foreign contents from third countries to
the importer, or contributes a larger portion of its domestic content to importer r’s gross
exports.
Tables A.1 and A.2 summarize the results. China remained among the top five down-
stream trade partners of all CPTPP countries except Brunei. Nonetheless, its dominance
decreased overall compared to Table 3, which is based on the narrow index of bilateral
downstreamness in (5). This suggests that the CPTPP countries tended to export their
domestic contents to China for further processing before reaching third-country destina-
tions. Third-country contents, however, did not pass on from CPTPP countries to China
as predominantly, and other downstream countries such as the US and Japan weighed more
heavily in this regard. Similarly, Korea’s overall importance as a downstream partner of the
CPTPP countries also decreased with the broad definition of bilateral downstreamness in
(9). In contrast, the US’s dominance as a downstream partner of Canada and Mexico further
increased when taking into account third-country contents received by the US from these
two countries (in addition to these two countries’ domestic contents intermediated by the
US). This might reflect the US’s status as a large final demand destination of third-country
contents.
Turning to key bilateral upstream partners of CPTPP members in Table A.2, China and
the US remained key upstream partners of these countries based on the alternative broad
definition in (10). But again, China’s importance tended to decrease while that of the US
with respect to Canada and Mexico increased (by around 5 percentage points) compared to
Table 4 based on formula (6). This suggests that China did not pass on domestic contents
to be incorporated in bilateral importers’ gross exports as substantially as it passed on third
countries’ contents to its bilateral importers. The reverse is true in the case of the US with
respect to its two neighboring countries. In other words, the US domestic contents were
heavily used in the gross exports of Canada and Mexico, more so than the proportion of
third-country contents passed on by the US to the two countries. These observations are
consistent with the finding in Section 6 that China is relatively downstream in the GVC,
while the US is relatively upstream.
With the exception of Canada and Mexico, most CPTPP countries were rather diversified
in their sourcing, as the index U˜Gsr was not highly concentrated at the top. The top upstream
partner typically intermediated around 20% of GVC-related gross imports of the bilateral
importer, followed closely by the second key upstream partner of the bilateral importer.
Canada and Mexico imported foreign contents disproportionally from the US, at more than
40% and up to 65% if we focus on contents sourcing from the CPTPP region plus the US.
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Table 1: Decomposition of gross exports by source-based approach
Gross exports from
country s to r
DVA
(1a*) in final goods exports Ysr directly absorbed by bilat-
eral importers
(2a*) in intermediate exports Asr absorbed by direct im-
porters as local final goods Yrr
in intermediate exports Asr absorbed
by bilateral importer r
(1b*) as s’s final goods Ysr after additional processing
stages
(2b*) as local final goods Yrr but only after further pro-
cessing stages
(3c*) as final goods from third countries Ykr
in intermediate goods exports Asr
absorbed by third countries
(1c*) as s’s final goods Ysk after additional processing
stages
(2c*) as local final goods Ykk
(3a*) as final goods from direct bilateral importer Yrj
(3b*) as final goods from direct bilateral importer Yrl but
only after further processing stages
(3d*) as final goods from other third countries Ykl
in intermediate goods exports Asr
absorbed at home
(4a*) as final goods of the bilateral importer Yrs
(4b*) as final goods of the bilateral importer Yrs but only
after additional processing stages
(4c*) as final goods of a third country Yks
(5*) as domestic final goods Yss
FVA, Vt6=s
(7*) in exports of final goods Ysr
(8*) in exports of intermediate goods Asr directly absorbed
by the importing country Yrr
in intermediate exports Asr
re-exported by r
(9a*) via final goods exports Yrj
(9b*) via intermediate exports Arj
purely double-counted
components
(6*) of domestic content
(9c*–9d*) of foreign content
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Table 2: Participation of CPTPP members in GVC
JAPAN V S GV CKWW GV CBM AUSTRALIA V S GV CKWW GV CBM
1995 5.61% 24.64% 25.54% 1995 11.97% 26.81% 27.00%
2000 7.38% 30.05% 31.12% 2000 15.69% 33.15% 33.43%
2005 11.07% 35.38% 36.32% 2005 11.97% 31.78% 32.04%
2011 14.66% 39.46% 40.47% 2011 13.90% 35.89% 36.24%
SINGAPORE V S GV CKWW GV CBM NEW ZEALAND V S GV CKWW GV CBM
1995 42.02% 52.12% 52.57% 1995 16.79% 25.77% 26.23%
2000 45.22% 59.45% 60.02% 2000 22.09% 33.33% 34.02%
2005 39.66% 55.38% 56.00% 2005 15.67% 27.10% 27.70%
2011 41.59% 56.48% 57.26% 2011 16.76% 29.36% 30.18%
MALAYSIA V S GV CKWW GV CBM CANADA V S GV CKWW GV CBM
1995 30.40% 43.10% 43.51% 1995 24.15% 33.21% 34.44%
2000 47.64% 60.09% 60.52% 2000 26.80% 35.56% 36.81%
2005 45.85% 58.48% 58.86% 2005 23.39% 32.78% 33.87%
2011 40.51% 55.67% 56.17% 2011 23.55% 37.95% 38.77%
VIETNAM V S GV CKWW GV CBM MEXICO V S GV CKWW GV CBM
1995 21.43% 31.70% 33.55% 1995 27.27% 36.01% 36.82%
2000 27.15% 42.04% 42.84% 2000 34.33% 42.20% 43.11%
2005 30.93% 44.72% 45.27% 2005 32.98% 40.92% 41.63%
2011 36.33% 48.52% 48.70% 2011 31.65% 43.21% 44.02%
BRUNEI V S GV CKWW GV CBM CHILE V S GV CKWW GV CBM
1995 7.26% 23.88% 24.09% 1995 14.10% 29.68% 30.10%
2000 5.35% 29.59% 29.91% 2000 21.34% 38.73% 40.60%
2005 4.64% 31.80% 32.16% 2005 18.72% 40.57% 41.73%
2011 4.26% 34.39% 34.80% 2011 19.98% 43.29% 44.75%
CHINA V S GV CKWW GV CBM PERU V S GV CKWW GV CBM
1995 30.96% 39.23% 39.54% 1995 9.85% 27.57% 27.89%
2000 35.89% 44.68% 45.27% 2000 10.71% 29.81% 30.51%
2005 37.31% 48.38% 48.93% 2005 12.31% 34.86% 35.42%
2011 32.04% 45.22% 45.82% 2011 11.79% 38.42% 38.97%
WORLD V S GV CKWW GV CBM USA V S GV CKWW GV CBM
1995 17.87% 32.71% 33.32% 1995 11.43% 28.75% 29.08%
2000 21.40% 38.42% 39.16% 2000 12.52% 33.87% 34.30%
2005 22.75% 40.51% 41.15% 2005 12.99% 33.87% 34.41%
2011 24.32% 43.02% 43.74% 2011 14.95% 35.25% 35.75%
Note: The measures are defined in equation (2) for V S, equation (3) for GV CKWW , and equation (4) for GV CBM .
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Table 3: Key downstream trade partners of CPTPP members (2011)
JAPAN World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.50 9.75 25.27 34.77 50.29
1st downstream partner CHN (34.37) CHN (37.08) CHN (40.58) CHN (28.06) CHN (34.51)
2nd downstream partner KOR (11.86) USA (12.06) KOR (9.94) KOR (14.98) KOR (12.73)
3rd downstream partner TWN (9.53) KOR (10.44) TWN (8.95) TWN (14.58) TWN (12.25)
4th downstream partner USA (6.48) TWN (9.02) USA (7.78) USA (9.25) USA (7.01)
5th downstream partner THA (5.83) THA (8.02) THA (5.75) THA (7.60) THA (5.97)
SINGAPORE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.44 23.60 33.35 35.88 45.63
1st downstream partner CHN (19.81) CHN (23.79) CHN (26.66) MYS (20.94) CHN (21.19)
2nd downstream partner MYS (14.84) MYS (16.64) MYS (15.81) CHN (16.25) MYS (18.72)
3rd downstream partner KOR (6.25) THA (7.92) KOR (6.10) KOR (8.93) KOR (7.90)
4th downstream partner THA (5.76) USA (7.19) THA (6.05) TWN (8.31) TWN (7.33)
5th downstream partner TWN (5.15) KOR (6.04) TWN (5.35) THA (7.34) THA (6.17)
MALAYSIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.76 21.58 30.42 47.06 55.90
1st downstream partner CHN (32.26) CHN (33.49) CHN (39.57) CHN (26.35) CHN (33.85)
2nd downstream partner SGP (7.82) SGP (9.56) SGP (7.32) KOR (9.60) KOR (8.02)
3rd downstream partner THA (7.32) THA (9.39) THA (7.17) THA (9.40) TWN (7.69)
4th downstream partner KOR (7.06) KOR (7.08) KOR (6.29) TWN (9.16) THA (7.63)
5th downstream partner TWN (6.24) AUS (6.73) TWN (5.87) SGP (9.01) SGP (7.45)
VIETNAM World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 22.55 37.81 36.39 51.65
1st downstream partner CHN (21.08) CHN (23.61) CHN (27.54) CHN (16.90) CHN (22.14)
2nd downstream partner MYS (11.82) MYS (12.95) KOR (11.05) MYS (14.70) KOR (13.05)
3rd downstream partner KOR (11.03) KOR (11.58) MYS (10.99) KOR (14.39) MYS (12.62)
4th downstream partner AUS (8.33) AUS (11.03) AUS (8.05) AUS (13.24) AUS (10.23)
5th downstream partner JPN (6.46) USA (9.11) JPN (6.32) JPN (7.12) JPN (7.35)
BRUNEI World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 59.83 61.95 64.38 66.51
1st downstream partner KOR (24.52) KOR (23.91) KOR (23.98) KOR (26.23) KOR (25.75)
2nd downstream partner AUS (20.71) AUS (22.24) AUS (19.14) AUS (24.92) AUS (22.18)
3rd downstream partner JPN (19.13) IDN (15.23) JPN (18.34) JPN (17.16) JPN (18.86)
4th downstream partner IDN (11.67) JPN (15.22) IDN (13.37) IDN (12.96) IDN (12.20)
5th downstream partner VNM (5.48) NZL (8.28) NZL (7.07) NZL (6.08) NZL (5.75)
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AUSTRALIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 26.37 31.75 53.18 58.56
1st downstream partner CHN (27.78) CHN (28.84) CHN (31.85) KOR (23.51) CHN (26.19)
2nd downstream partner KOR (17.12) KOR (19.31) KOR (16.89) CHN (21.39) KOR (20.24)
3rd downstream partner JPN (10.55) JPN (9.82) JPN (10.23) JPN (12.36) JPN (11.83)
4th downstream partner TWN (7.73) TWN (8.67) TWN (7.93) TWN (10.84) TWN (9.55)
5th downstream partner IND (5.32) THA (7.09) THA (5.50) THA (6.27) THA (5.32)
NEW ZEALAND World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.36 39.51 49.31 50.27 60.06
1st downstream partner AUS (25.15) AUS (31.61) AUS (25.01) AUS (36.31) AUS (29.86)
2nd downstream partner CHN (17.45) CHN (20.06) CHN (23.24) CHN (13.93) CHN (18.25)
3rd downstream partner SGP (7.86) SGP (9.37) SGP (7.94) SGP (8.50) SGP (7.69)
4th downstream partner KOR (5.73) USA (6.01) KOR (5.80) KOR (6.99) KOR (6.70)
5th downstream partner JPN (4.66) KOR (5.59) MYS (4.23) MYS (5.30) JPN (4.91)
CANADA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.87 7.30 74.05 12.19 78.93
1st downstream partner USA (52.67) USA (72.27) USA (60.62) USA (66.73) USA (58.48)
2nd downstream partner CHN (8.98) CHN (7.59) CHN (10.10) CHN (6.90) CHN (9.26)
3rd downstream partner KOR (4.15) KOR (3.57) MEX (6.49) KOR (5.37) MEX (5.71)
4th downstream partner GBR (4.03) MEX (1.89) KOR (3.67) JPN (2.16) KOR (4.90)
5th downstream partner MEX (3.20) GBR (1.58) GBR (2.60) TWN (1.90) GBR (2.58)
MEXICO World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.82 10.40 80.06 13.54 83.21
1st downstream partner USA (57.60) USA (78.22) USA (59.89) USA (73.90) USA (59.40)
2nd downstream partner CAN (10.43) CHN (4.78) CAN (18.46) CAN (4.92) CAN (16.91)
3rd downstream partner CHN (6.03) CAN (4.69) CHN (5.89) CHN (4.48) CHN (5.56)
4th downstream partner ESP (5.27) KOR (1.88) ESP (2.67) KOR (2.93) ESP (2.61)
5th downstream partner ROW (2.49) ESP (1.30) KOR (1.86) ROW (1.52) KOR (2.53)
CHILE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.05 18.80 29.11 42.52 52.83
1st downstream partner CHN (34.19) CHN (39.57) CHN (39.58) CHN (31.50) CHN (35.02)
2nd downstream partner KOR (9.41) USA (11.63) KOR (8.64) KOR (14.08) KOR (10.88)
3rd downstream partner USA (5.60) KOR (10.72) CAN (7.08) USA (9.78) USA (6.70)
4th downstream partner JPN (5.12) TWN (5.84) USA (6.97) TWN (8.09) TWN (6.65)
5th downstream partner TWN (5.00) JPN (5.13) MEX (5.84) JPN (7.25) CAN (6.28)
PERU World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 25.92 40.54 46.10 60.73
1st downstream partner CHN (19.05) CHN (24.25) CAN (30.08) KOR (19.93) CAN (26.51)
2nd downstream partner CAN (16.62) KOR (15.91) CHN (19.97) CHN (18.35) CHN (17.59)
3rd downstream partner KOR (11.24) USA (13.05) KOR (10.28) CHL (13.09) KOR (13.35)
4th downstream partner CHL (8.78) CAN (11.58) CHL (7.52) CAN (10.76) CHL (9.57)
5th downstream partner ESP (8.23) CHL (9.99) USA (6.84) USA (10.40) USA (6.49)
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Table 4: Key upstream trade partners of CPTPP members (2011)
JAPAN World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 15.37 28.07 36.72 49.43
1st upstream partner CHN (29.28) CHN (32.57) CHN (32.47) CHN (22.18) CHN (25.60)
2nd upstream partner KOR (10.97) USA (14.52) KOR (11.18) KOR (14.17) KOR (12.05)
3rd upstream partner USA (7.19) KOR (13.64) USA (8.32) USA (14.07) USA (9.33)
4th upstream partner THA (4.31) THA (5.31) AUS (4.55) THA (6.23) THA (5.25)
5th upstream partner TWN (3.94) AUS (5.21) THA (4.46) TWN (5.48) TWN (5.10)
SINGAPORE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 16.22 29.29 24.46 37.52
1st upstream partner MYS (9.18) CHN (14.60) CHN (12.35) USA (12.63) MYS (11.01)
2nd upstream partner CHN (9.11) USA (13.37) MYS (10.18) MYS (11.66) CHN (9.64)
3rd upstream partner TWN (8.83) TWN (12.21) TWN (9.66) TWN (10.60) KOR (9.15)
4th upstream partner IND (7.99) MYS (10.65) KOR (9.00) KOR (10.18) USA (9.13)
5th upstream partner KOR (7.44) KOR (10.40) USA (8.62) CHN (10.16) TWN (9.06)
MALAYSIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 26.96 35.59 40.78 49.40
1st upstream partner SGP (17.96) CHN (24.71) CHN (22.49) CHN (17.32) CHN (17.48)
2nd upstream partner CHN (17.56) THA (12.89) SGP (15.34) SGP (13.63) SGP (15.47)
3rd upstream partner THA (9.39) SGP (12.67) THA (10.84) THA (12.50) THA (11.00)
4th upstream partner TWN (7.58) TWN (10.51) TWN (9.20) TWN (10.35) TWN (9.37)
5th upstream partner KOR (6.01) KOR (7.90) KOR (7.20) KOR (8.32) KOR (7.66)
VIETNAM World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 20.70 25.05 43.57 47.92
1st upstream partner CHN (25.09) CHN (30.78) CHN (29.37) CHN (23.94) CHN (24.25)
2nd upstream partner KOR (16.19) KOR (18.20) KOR (17.54) KOR (20.02) KOR (19.08)
3rd upstream partner TWN (13.51) TWN (15.30) TWN (13.84) TWN (15.16) TWN (13.98)
4th upstream partner THA (9.53) THA (11.16) THA (10.03) THA (11.27) THA (10.31)
5th upstream partner SGP (6.16) MYS (4.48) SGP (5.01) MYS (5.01) SGP (5.17)
BRUNEI World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 41.71 62.03 49.35 69.67
1st upstream partner SGP (28.91) SGP (24.63) SGP (30.25) SGP (25.34) SGP (29.47)
2nd upstream partner MYS (19.73) MYS (22.73) MYS (19.93) MYS (22.00) MYS (20.03)
3rd upstream partner USA (11.80) USA (19.60) USA (13.20) USA (19.20) USA (14.39)
4th upstream partner GBR (5.35) CHN (7.15) CHN (6.38) THA (5.17) CHN (4.90)
5th upstream partner CHN (5.30) THA (5.71) THA (4.69) CHN (4.93) THA (4.52)
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AUSTRALIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 23.57 37.34 39.03 52.80
1st upstream partner CHN (19.60) CHN (28.59) CHN (26.11) CHN (20.68) CHN (20.91)
2nd upstream partner SGP (10.26) USA (15.10) USA (9.80) USA (14.68) USA (10.56)
3rd upstream partner USA (7.74) THA (10.25) SGP (8.64) THA (10.03) SGP (8.90)
4th upstream partner THA (6.35) SGP (7.63) THA (8.22) SGP (8.27) THA (8.46)
5th upstream partner KOR (5.68) KOR (5.87) KOR (5.28) KOR (6.27) KOR (5.69)
NEW ZEALAND World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 34.98 45.01 45.89 55.92
1st upstream partner CHN (15.12) CHN (22.58) CHN (19.95) CHN (16.32) CHN (15.98)
2nd upstream partner AUS (12.44) AUS (12.75) AUS (14.22) AUS (14.50) AUS (15.18)
3rd upstream partner SGP (10.64) USA (11.03) SGP (9.64) USA (10.95) SGP (9.73)
4th upstream partner KOR (6.73) SGP (9.07) USA (7.15) SGP (9.35) USA (7.86)
5th upstream partner USA (6.10) KOR (8.67) KOR (7.06) KOR (8.25) KOR (7.08)
CANADA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 10.33 59.70 19.86 69.22
1st upstream partner USA (37.25) USA (50.26) USA (34.46) USA (51.10) USA (39.08)
2nd upstream partner CHN (14.68) CHN (21.06) CHN (19.63) CHN (14.12) CHN (14.68)
3rd upstream partner MEX (8.14) MEX (5.31) MEX (14.94) MEX (7.56) MEX (14.24)
4th upstream partner GBR (3.82) KOR (3.85) KOR (3.61) KOR (3.91) KOR (3.71)
5th upstream partner DEU (3.67) TWN (2.91) TWN (2.60) TWN (2.78) TWN (2.58)
MEXICO World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 10.72 62.20 23.49 74.96
1st upstream partner USA (38.56) USA (49.08) USA (37.18) USA (50.07) USA (40.43)
2nd upstream partner CHN (20.73) CHN (26.18) CHN (26.25) CHN (19.51) CHN (20.85)
3rd upstream partner KOR (5.01) KOR (5.77) CAN (7.34) KOR (6.62) CAN (6.66)
4th upstream partner DEU (4.61) TWN (3.00) KOR (6.01) TWN (3.18) KOR (6.65)
5th upstream partner CAN (4.27) MYS (2.47) TWN (2.96) MYS (2.77) TWN (3.11)
CHILE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 11.75 32.64 25.68 46.30
1st upstream partner CHN (19.28) USA (34.79) CHN (23.39) USA (31.62) USA (22.92)
2nd upstream partner USA (19.09) CHN (25.67) USA (23.20) CHN (19.51) CHN (19.32)
3rd upstream partner ROW (8.45) KOR (7.42) ROW (7.33) KOR (8.20) ROW (8.76)
4th upstream partner KOR (5.95) ROW (5.55) KOR (6.62) ROW (7.95) KOR (7.32)
5th upstream partner DEU (4.63) JPN (3.26) MEX (6.41) MEX (3.96) MEX (6.67)
PERU World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 14.71 34.19 30.45 49.92
1st upstream partner CHN (22.76) CHN (30.74) CHN (26.26) USA (25.75) CHN (21.62)
2nd upstream partner USA (16.05) USA (27.66) USA (17.58) CHN (22.98) USA (18.03)
3rd upstream partner MEX (7.79) KOR (6.84) MEX (13.00) KOR (7.66) MEX (13.13)
4th upstream partner ROW (6.03) MEX (5.42) KOR (5.92) MEX (7.52) KOR (6.66)
5th upstream partner KOR (5.37) THA (3.58) ROW (4.37) ROW (4.82) ROW (5.17)
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Table 5: Position of CPTPP countries in the GVC (1995 and 2011)
1995 2011
VS GVCBM Ratio VS GVCBM Ratio
Japan 5.62% 25.54% 0.22 Brunei 4.26% 34.80% 0.12
Brunei 7.26% 24.09% 0.30 Peru 11.79% 38.97% 0.30
Peru 9.85% 27.89% 0.35 Japan 14.70% 40.47& 0.36
United States 11.43% 29.08% 0.39 Australia 13.90% 36.24% 0.38
Australia 11.97% 27.00% 0.44 United States 14.97% 35.75% 0.42
Chile 14.11% 30.10% 0.47 Chile 20.21% 44.75% 0.45
New Zealand 16.83% 26.33% 0.64 New Zealand 16.82% 30.18% 0.56
Vietnam 21.62% 33.55% 0.64 Canada 23.57% 38.77% 0.61
Malaysia 30.41% 43.51% 0.70 China 32.11% 45.82% 0.70
Canada 24.21% 34.44% 0.70 Mexico 31.69% 44.02% 0.72
Mexico 27.28% 36.82% 0.74 Malaysia 40.58% 56.17% 0.72
China 30.98% 39.54% 0.78 Singapore 41.73% 57.26% 0.73
Singapore 42.06% 52.57% 0.80 Vietnam 36.33% 48.70% 0.75
Note: The measures are defined in equation (2) for V S, and equation (4) for GV CBM . The
ratio is defined by V S/GV CBM .
Figure 1: GVC participation (for year 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
JAPAN SINGAPORE MALAYSIA VIETNAM BRUNEI AUSTRALIA NEW
ZEALAND
CANADA MEXICO CHILE PERU CHINA USA WORLD
Backward Linkages Forward Linkages
Note: Backward linkage is measured by V S in equation (2); forward linkage is measured by
GV CBM in equation (4) net of V S in equation (2).
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Table 6: Participation in GVC by sector
Sectors JPN Sectors AUS
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 70.11% 11 Basic metals 62.23%
11 Basic metals 60.60% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 49.79%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 56.11% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 47.58%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 55.99% 09 Rubber and plastics products 46.09%
09 Rubber and plastics products 50.95% 12 Fabricated metal products 39.89%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 50.80% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 39.27%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 46.00% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 39.19%
02 Mining and quarrying 46.00% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 39.02%
12 Fabricated metal products 44.36% 02 Mining and quarrying 38.98%
24 Post and telecommunications 42.02% 17 Other transport equipment 38.79%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 41.53% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 38.73%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 40.91% 29 R&D and other business activities 38.48%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 39.91% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 38.39%
23 Transport and storage 39.83% 24 Post and telecommunications 38.21%
29 R&D and other business activities 34.88% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 35.32%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 34.65% 20 Construction 34.55%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 33.48% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 34.17%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 33.32% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 33.62%
25 Financial intermediation 31.80% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 32.92%
17 Other transport equipment 27.19% 23 Transport and storage 30.52%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 25.90% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 30.32%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 21.88% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 29.53%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 21.55% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 28.90%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 17.70% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 25.20%
33 Other community, social and personal services 16.91% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 22.51%
28 Computer and related activities 15.99% 25 Financial intermediation 22.28%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 13.87% 28 Computer and related activities 21.47%
20 Construction 13.38% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 21.44%
22 Hotels and restaurants 9.93% 32 Health and social work 14.78%
32 Health and social work 9.20% 33 Other community, social and personal services 12.55%
26 Real estate activities 5.67% 22 Hotels and restaurants 10.79%
31 Education 3.23% 31 Education 5.15%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 0% 26 Real estate activities 4.68%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
Sectors SGP Sectors NZL
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 85.00% 11 Basic metals 57.80%
11 Basic metals 81.78% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 54.20%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 71.46% 02 Mining and quarrying 50.85%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 65.69% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 44.36%
12 Fabricated metal products 64.20% 25 Financial intermediation 44.02%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 63.58% 29 R&D and other business activities 38.59%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 62.76% 09 Rubber and plastics products 38.07%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 62.49% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 37.90%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 59.68% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 37.83%
09 Rubber and plastics products 59.13% 20 Construction 37.44%
02 Mining and quarrying 59.06% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 37.42%
28 Computer and related activities 58.71% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 37.35%
23 Transport and storage 57.72% 17 Other transport equipment 36.77%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 57.59% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 34.76%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 57.05% 12 Fabricated metal products 34.47%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 54.98% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 33.92%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 54.80% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 33.89%
29 R&D and other business activities 54.24% 24 Post and telecommunications 33.08%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 53.36% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 32.19%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 50.09% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 28.98%
24 Post and telecommunications 49.39% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 28.09%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 47.79% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 27.99%
17 Other transport equipment 46.88% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 27.58%
20 Construction 46.13% 23 Transport and storage 24.80%
25 Financial intermediation 45.41% 28 Computer and related activities 21.90%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 45.27% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 19.23%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 44.94% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 17.98%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 43.20% 26 Real estate activities 16.15%
31 Education 41.73% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 15.94%
33 Other community, social and personal services 35.12% 32 Health and social work 15.52%
32 Health and social work 34.37% 33 Other community, social and personal services 15.34%
22 Hotels and restaurants 33.25% 22 Hotels and restaurants 13.01%
26 Real estate activities 33.18% 31 Education 12.75%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
34
Sectors MYS Sectors CAN
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 78.99% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 65.50%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 74.55% 11 Basic metals 62.56%
11 Basic metals 73.92% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 49.82%
12 Fabricated metal products 67.70% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 49.77%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 64.81% 12 Fabricated metal products 49.04%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 61.55% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 48.08%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 61.35% 09 Rubber and plastics products 46.76%
09 Rubber and plastics products 59.25% 17 Other transport equipment 46.26%
17 Other transport equipment 59.23% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 45.52%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 57.92% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 37.34%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 57.88% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 36.65%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 56.99% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 34.24%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 56.29% 02 Mining and quarrying 32.41%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 54.87% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 32.21%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 52.18% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 32.10%
29 R&D and other business activities 49.07% 20 Construction 31.76%
23 Transport and storage 48.35% 23 Transport and storage 28.96%
25 Financial intermediation 43.93% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 28.22%
02 Mining and quarrying 43.90% 29 R&D and other business activities 28.07%
20 Construction 43.17% 24 Post and telecommunications 27.27%
28 Computer and related activities 40.30% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 26.71%
32 Health and social work 39.82% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 25.74%
24 Post and telecommunications 39.79% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 25.69%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 39.13% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 23.56%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 37.75% 33 Other community, social and personal services 20.18%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 37.49% 25 Financial intermediation 18.57%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 33.21% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 17.70%
33 Other community, social and personal services 32.51% 32 Health and social work 17.06%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 28.98% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 14.31%
22 Hotels and restaurants 23.66% 28 Computer and related activities 14.16%
31 Education 13.51% 22 Hotels and restaurants 13.07%
26 Real estate activities 5.93% 31 Education 7.63%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0% 26 Real estate activities 6.72%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
Sectors VNM Sectors MEX
11 Basic metals 81.32% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 69.31%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 79.21% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 57.12%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 76.80% 12 Fabricated metal products 57.00%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 76.01% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 54.54%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 74.90% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 51.76%
09 Rubber and plastics products 73.10% 09 Rubber and plastics products 51.46%
12 Fabricated metal products 67.59% 20 Construction 51.28%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 67.56% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 48.96%
17 Other transport equipment 67.27% 11 Basic metals 46.99%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 64.19% 17 Other transport equipment 43.86%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 58.14% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 41.33%
29 R&D and other business activities 53.19% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 41.20%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 53.06% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 41.08%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 51.67% 29 R&D and other business activities 38.37%
25 Financial intermediation 50.52% 24 Post and telecommunications 32.77%
02 Mining and quarrying 46.92% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 32.74%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 46.22% 28 Computer and related activities 30.57%
20 Construction 45.25% 02 Mining and quarrying 29.51%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 44.80% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 28.88%
23 Transport and storage 42.41% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 27.01%
24 Post and telecommunications 36.28% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 23.46%
28 Computer and related activities 35.32% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 21.42%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 33.86% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 20.58%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 30.97% 23 Transport and storage 20.34%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 29.52% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 19.41%
32 Health and social work 28.17% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 14.98%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 26.43% 25 Financial intermediation 14.32%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 23.33% 33 Other community, social and personal services 5.72%
26 Real estate activities 22.69% 32 Health and social work 4.75%
33 Other community, social and personal services 14.74% 22 Hotels and restaurants 4.07%
22 Hotels and restaurants 13.40% 26 Real estate activities 2.53%
31 Education 12.96% 31 Education 1.39%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 11.38% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
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Sectors BRN Sectors CHL
12 Fabricated metal products 71.70% 11 Basic metals 59.94%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 62.38% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 59.21%
11 Basic metals 60.61% 23 Transport and storage 50.05%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 57.10% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 47.42%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 55.44% 09 Rubber and plastics products 46.54%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 54.81% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 45.75%
09 Rubber and plastics products 54.39% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 43.38%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 53.70% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 42.31%
29 R&D and other business activities 48.44% 02 Mining and quarrying 42.07%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 48.36% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 40.28%
17 Other transport equipment 46.26% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 36.19%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 45.16% 12 Fabricated metal products 35.54%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 44.95% 29 R&D and other business activities 33.86%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 42.16% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 33.58%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 39.85% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 33.18%
20 Construction 39.14% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 32.34%
25 Financial intermediation 38.83% 17 Other transport equipment 31.95%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 37.95% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 31.48%
02 Mining and quarrying 35.03% 25 Financial intermediation 30.54%
24 Post and telecommunications 34.28% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 28.96%
22 Hotels and restaurants 31.11% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 28.33%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 28.97% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 26.92%
23 Transport and storage 28.88% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 25.83%
28 Computer and related activities 26.10% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 25.68%
33 Other community, social and personal services 25.81% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 24.38%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 22.92% 24 Post and telecommunications 22.76%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 18.82% 28 Computer and related activities 20.60%
31 Education 11.64% 20 Construction 19.53%
26 Real estate activities 3.76% 22 Hotels and restaurants 14.56%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2.18% 31 Education 13.45%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 0% 26 Real estate activities 11.60%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0% 32 Health and social work 11.05%
32 Health and social work 0% 33 Other community, social and personal services 10.75%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
Sectors CHN Sectors PER
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 66.63% 11 Basic metals 60.89%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 61.89% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 54.10%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 60.84% 12 Fabricated metal products 50.19%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 60.81% 09 Rubber and plastics products 46.33%
11 Basic metals 57.32% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 43.25%
12 Fabricated metal products 55.87% 02 Mining and quarrying 41.45%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 55.24% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 40.71%
09 Rubber and plastics products 55.04% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 39.88%
02 Mining and quarrying 54.34% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 35.41%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 49.85% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 30.33%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 43.71% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 29.24%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 43.62% 29 R&D and other business activities 27.39%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 41.55% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 27.02%
29 R&D and other business activities 40.93% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 25.62%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 40.25% 23 Transport and storage 25.58%
17 Other transport equipment 38.71% 17 Other transport equipment 24.44%
24 Post and telecommunications 36.01% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 24.39%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 34.02% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 24.28%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 33.00% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 24.04%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 30.41% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 24.01%
28 Computer and related activities 29.61% 28 Computer and related activities 22.54%
23 Transport and storage 29.16% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 21.16%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 26.14% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 20.63%
20 Construction 24.31% 25 Financial intermediation 17.55%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 22.50% 24 Post and telecommunications 17.49%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 19.87% 33 Other community, social and personal services 15.98%
33 Other community, social and personal services 14.75% 22 Hotels and restaurants 10.84%
25 Financial intermediation 11.50% 32 Health and social work 8.80%
32 Health and social work 10.05% 31 Education 3.67%
26 Real estate activities 8.14% 26 Real estate activities 1.57%
22 Hotels and restaurants 5.28% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 0%
31 Education 5.09% 20 Construction 0%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
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Sectors WORLD Sectors USA
11 Basic metals 64.00% 11 Basic metals 68.33%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 60.09% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 53.26%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 57.48% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 47.39%
09 Rubber and plastics products 57.03% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 47.14%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 55.10% 09 Rubber and plastics products 46.93%
12 Fabricated metal products 53.70% 12 Fabricated metal products 46.08%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 53.12% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 44.10%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 49.64% 02 Mining and quarrying 43.57%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 46.85% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 40.98%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 45.24% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 40.19%
17 Other transport equipment 44.73% 29 R&D and other business activities 39.37%
29 R&D and other business activities 42.71% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 38.51%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 42.20% 17 Other transport equipment 36.96%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 41.15% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 36.76%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 40.74% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 36.48%
23 Transport and storage 39.97% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 34.92%
02 Mining and quarrying 39.05% 24 Post and telecommunications 32.53%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 39.03% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 29.78%
25 Financial intermediation 37.46% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 29.07%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 36.93% 25 Financial intermediation 28.92%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 36.74% 32 Health and social work 28.83%
24 Post and telecommunications 35.62% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 27.95%
28 Computer and related activities 35.35% 28 Computer and related activities 27.25%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 31.16% 23 Transport and storage 27.16%
20 Construction 29.79% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 25.73%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 29.50% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 24.44%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 29.14% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 23.15%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 28.12% 31 Education 20.34%
33 Other community, social and personal services 22.21% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 20.24%
22 Hotels and restaurants 19.80% 20 Construction 17.68%
32 Health and social work 18.32% 33 Other community, social and personal services 15.44%
31 Education 13.91% 22 Hotels and restaurants 7.92%
26 Real estate activities 9.16% 26 Real estate activities 6.33%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
Figure 2: Fraction of domestic contents directly absorbed by bilateral importers (2011)
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Table 7: Key downstream trade partners for selected sectors (2011)
JAPAN Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner CHN (27.82) CHN (25.82) CHN (51.21) CHN (55.98) USA (20.01)
2nd downstream partner KOR (20.50) KOR (20.99) TWN (10.80) KOR (7.96) CHN (12.09)
3rd downstream partner TWN (13.71) THA (14.04) KOR (8.10) THA (6.00) CAN (9.69)
4th downstream partner THA (6.48) TWN (11.79) MYS (7.17) DEU (3.89) RUS (8.80)
5th downstream partner USA (3.90) MYS (5.98) USA (3.85) MEX (3.82) THA (5.48)
SINGAPORE Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner MYS (25.20) MYS (31.79) CHN (25.62) MYS (26.68) IDN (13.54)
2nd downstream partner CHN (20.50) TWN (10.37) MYS (25.42) CHN (24.39) ROW (13.17)
3rd downstream partner THA (10.72) CHN (6.64) KOR (11.18) IDN (8.83) KOR (8.55)
4th downstream partner KOR (5.58) THA (6.54) TWN (10.85) THA (8.20) DEU (8.41)
5th downstream partner IDN (4.66) JPN (5.26) USA (3.64) KOR (3.91) THA (8.34)
MALAYSIA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner CHN (39.12) CHN (35.11) CHN (64.77) CHN (39.59) THA (20.66)
2nd downstream partner USA (6.97) THA (11.10) USA (4.74) THA (11.93) IDN (11.50)
3rd downstream partner THA (6.34) KOR (9.73) MEX (4.56) MEX (8.63) JPN (10.55)
4th downstream partner JPN (6.17) JPN (6.58) TWN (4.31) DEU (6.82) CHN (8.10)
5th downstream partner SGP (4.56) TWN (5.66) KOR (3.44) SGP (5.79) ROW (7.93)
VIETNAM Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner MYS (13.46) THA (15.52) CHN (42.84) CHN (41.09) JPN (34.85)
2nd downstream partner JPN (13.09) KOR (13.87) MYS (7.03) JPN (21.31) KOR (13.72)
3rd downstream partner CHN (11.30) MYS (13.58) THA (5.15) KOR (9.27) CZE (11.46)
4th downstream partner USA (6.46) TWN (11.34) TWN (4.15) THA (5.22) USA (8.52)
5th downstream partner DEU (5.66) JPN (6.99) RUS (3.91) USA (4.07) CHN (7.19)
BRUNEI Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner CHN (39.25) MYS (23.70) MYS (48.60) MYS (28.11) MYS (58.61)
2nd downstream partner TWN (19.21) THA (20.60) SGP (22.40) SGP (20.34) KOR (17.59)
3rd downstream partner AUS (13.07) USA (19.91) GBR (10.08) DEU (17.31) ROW (6.00)
4th downstream partner MYS (5.73) SGP (13.49) DEU (7.74) TWN (16.27) USA (4.17)
5th downstream partner SGP (4.49) CHN (6.10) TWN (4.12) THA (6.50) GBR (3.44)
AUSTRALIA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner CHN (23.09) CHN (24.40) CHN (22.97) CHN (31.17) KOR (35.54)
2nd downstream partner NZL (13.74) THA (19.20) USA (12.93) KOR (10.45) CHN (12.00)
3rd downstream partner MEX (6.93) KOR (10.79) MYS (9.64) MYS (8.70) ROW (10.32)
4th downstream partner ROW (6.77) TWN (8.56) GBR (8.46) THA (6.27) USA (7.02)
5th downstream partner MYS (6.50) MYS (6.63) KOR (7.16) DEU (4.71) CAN (4.86)
NEW ZEALAND Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner AUS (49.20) AUS (30.23) CHN (22.10) AUS (25.51) AUS (36.56)
2nd downstream partner CHN (8.75) JPN (25.81) USA (14.50) CHN (14.15) ROW (13.65)
3rd downstream partner THA (4.75) KOR (12.52) FRA (7.51) KOR (12.58) USA (10.20)
4th downstream partner USA (4.62) USA (5.27) TWN (6.91) USA (7.04) GBR (4.79)
5th downstream partner GBR (4.51) GBR (3.52) MYS (6.86) GBR (4.87) CHN (3.50)
CANADA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner USA (70.92) USA (55.41) CHN (29.73) USA (43.50) USA (87.24)
2nd downstream partner MEX (11.47) NOR (9.61) USA (29.23) CHN (16.13) MEX (6.82)
3rd downstream partner CHN (5.43) GBR (6.90) HUN (9.80) MEX (14.73) CHN (1.24)
4th downstream partner DEU (1.13) CHN (5.67) MEX (6.42) DEU (3.07) ROW (0.68)
5th downstream partner KOR (1.01) MEX (5.61) GBR (3.30) GBR (3.01) DEU (0.55)
MEXICO Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner USA (57.01) USA (57.49) USA (55.73) USA (63.26) USA (51.27)
2nd downstream partner CAN (9.25) CAN (13.2) CHN (14.56) CAN (12.98) CAN (30.39)
3rd downstream partner CHN (6.31) KOR (5.64) CAN (7.59) CHN (9.51) DEU (8.04)
4th downstream partner CRI (4.30) CHN (5.47) KOR (2.27) DEU (3.07) CHN (1.49)
5th downstream partner ROW (3.82) JPN (2.56) JPN (1.84) KOR (1.07) ARG (1.24)
CHILE Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner MEX (21.82) CHN (41.31) ROW (74.35) CHN (27.36) ARG (24.89)
2nd downstream partner USA (19.89) KOR (9.43) DEU (5.42) PER (8.01) ROW (11.14)
3rd downstream partner ARG (14.98) TWN (7.85) VNM (3.20) KOR (5.32) CAN (10.68)
4th downstream partner ROW (14.08) ITA (6.92) MEX (3.17) MEX (5.03) BRA (10.50)
5th downstream partner BRA (7.21) USA (6.29) IRL (2.37) COL (4.96) MEX (10.44)
PERU Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner CHN (27.91) CAN (55.41) ROW (65.36) CRI (40.02) ROW (71.45)
2nd downstream partner COL (21.78) ITA (11.13) MAR (10.45) ROW (25.30) MAR (15.22)
3rd downstream partner MEX (16.31) CHN (8.91) KOR (4.24) CHL (7.75) COL (9.14)
4th downstream partner USA (6.69) USA (8.48) FRA (3.59) COL (3.99) USA (1.12)
5th downstream partner CHL (6,55) TWN (3.99) USA (2.97) MAR (3.99) CHL (1.05)
Sector descriptions: Sector 9 – Rubber and plastics products, Sector 11 – Basic metals, Sector 14 – Computer,
electronic and optical equipment, Sector 15 – Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec, and Sector 16 – Motor
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers.
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Table 8: Key upstream trade partners for selected sectors (2011)
JAPAN Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (40.55) KOR (24.67) CHN (61.16) CHN (55.67) DEU (26.09)
2nd upstream partner TWN (9.08) CHN (9.32) TWN (5.90) VNM (9.33) CHN (13.92)
3rd upstream partner KOR (8.36) RUS (8.06) MYS (5.81) THA (6.74) THA (7.86)
4th upstream partner THA (7.87) TWN (7.23) KOR (5.34) MYS (4.01) USA (6.05)
5th upstream partner MYS (6.43) ZAF (6.09) USA (3.50) KOR (3.57) KOR (5.47)
SINGAPORE Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner MYS (24.64) CHN (10.82) CHN (28.60) CHN (28.54) DEU (24.18)
2nd upstream partner CHN (17.16) MYS (10.34) MYS (18.05) MYS (19.08) USA (12.07)
3rd upstream partner USA (6.92) JPN (9.50) TWN (14.23) IDN (7.62) IND (8.28)
4th upstream partner THA (6.18) KOR (9.00) KOR (8.86) USA (6.18) GBR (6.25)
5th upstream partner DEU (5.13) TUR (6.73) USA (3.22) DEU (4.82) MYS (5.83)
MALAYSIA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (22.27) KOR (14.77) CHN (32.83) CHN (41.23) THA (37.43)
2nd upstream partner THA (19.44) JPN (12.96) SGP (16.61) THA (16.41) DEU (15.89)
3rd upstream partner VNM (10.12) TWN (12.52) TWN (9.76) USA (5.04) JPN (14.43)
4th upstream partner JPN (6.52) CHN (8.20) KOR (6.32) DEU (4.44) CHN (8.36)
5th upstream partner SGP (6.06) AUS (7.00) JPN (6.28) JPN (3.94) KOR (5.08)
VIETNAM Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (26.14) KOR (27.62) CHN (54.80) CHN (51.32) THA (25.94)
2nd upstream partner THA (16.05) TWN (17.23) KOR (18.23) THA (12.71) KOR (25.89)
3rd upstream partner KOR (13.65) CHN (12.23) MYS (4.92) KOR (9.65) CHN (16.98)
4th upstream partner TWN (12.38) JPN (9.08) JPN (4.62) JPN (4.01) DEU (4.42)
5th upstream partner JPN (11.02) AUS (6.01) TWN (3.27) MYS (3.75) JPN (4.01)
BRUNEI Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner MYS (31.22) MYS (27.75) SGP (30.84) MYS (19.98) THA (25.41)
2nd upstream partner SGP (16.67) CHN (19.09) CHN (20.71) THA (15.12) JPN (17.62)
3rd upstream partner CHN (11.66) JPN (17.67) MYS (10.45) ITA (13.98) MYS (15.91)
4th upstream partner THA (7.59) USA (6.40) TWN (9.15) SGP (10.75) KOR (11.42)
5th upstream partner KOR (7.29) SGP (4.67) USA (5.55) GBR (7.32) DEU (11.21)
AUSTRALIA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (30.77) ROW (15.27) CHN (61.30) CHN (38.46) THA (20.75)
2nd upstream partner THA (8.73) THA (14.73) MYS (7.02) DEU (6.97) KOR (15.04)
3rd upstream partner MYS (6.10) GBR (7.37) USA (3.39) USA (5.64) DEU (13.21)
4th upstream partner TWN (5.92) CHN (6.64) SGP (2.70) GBR (4.40) JPN (12.05)
5th upstream partner USA (5.55) JPN (6.58) TWN (2.30) MYS (3.77) USA (8.15)
NEW ZEALAND Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (25.60) AUS (27.91) CHN (54.46) CHN (30.98) JPN (14.93)
2nd upstream partner AUS (14.76) RUS (16.14) MYS (7.98) AUS (13.13) THA (14.31)
3rd upstream partner THA (8.02) TWN (11.55) AUS (5.62) DEU (8.69) DEU (13.93)
4th upstream partner TWN (5.69) KOR (7.33) SGP (4.22) MYS (4.28) AUS (12.18)
5th upstream partner MYS (5.37) CHN (6.70) USA (3.46) USA (3.98) KOR (10.76)
CANADA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner USA (36.61) USA (29.27) CHN (51.11) CHN (29.88) USA (60.47)
2nd upstream partner CHN (25.87) PER (6.48) MEX (14.90) MEX (22.33) MEX (18.82)
3rd upstream partner TWN (4.14) ROW (6.03) USA (8.05) USA (21.46) DEU (5.48)
4th upstream partner MEX (3.91) DEU (5.61) TWN (4.45) DEU (4.37) KOR (4.57)
5th upstream partner DEU (3.57) ARG (5.42) MYS (3.34) MYS (1.69) JPN (3.03)
MEXICO Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner USA (35.64) USA (31.58) CHN (60.55) CHN (39.61) USA (53.88)
2nd upstream partner CHN (19.64) CAN (12.32) KOR (8.62) USA (22.68) DEU (9.24)
3rd upstream partner DEU (6.07) CHN (9.28) MYS (7.31) DEU (5.16) CAN (8.41)
4th upstream partner KOR (5.81) DEU (7.68) USA (5.05) MYS (4.51) KOR (5.31)
5th upstream partner CAN (5.79) ITA (7.33) TWN (3.74) KOR (3.48) JPN (4.41)
CHILE Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner ROW (30.41) CHN (23.44) CHN (61.32) CHN (32.57) KOR (20.71)
2nd upstream partner CHN (21.57) KOR (9.63) MEX (11.14) DEU (8.11) USA (11.31)
3rd upstream partner USA (5.39) BRA (9.48) ROW (8.44) USA (7.63) MEX (10.74)
4th upstream partner ARG (5.35) ESP (6.68) USA (3.49) ESP (7.24) CHN (10.11)
5th upstream partner BRA (3.87) DEU (6.17) KOR (1.65) MEX (5.06) THA (7.40)
PERU Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (21.80) TUR (17.69) CHN (57.32) CHN (35.74) KOR (17.30)
2nd upstream partner MEX (13.04) CHN (17.68) MEX (14.56) USA (13.03) CHN (13.72)
3rd upstream partner USA (8.29) KOR (10.57) MYS (4.99) MEX (6.35) MEX (10.11)
4th upstream partner ROW (5.59) USA (8.90) KOR (3.95) ROW (5.51) USA (9.90)
5th upstream partner KOR (4.51) MEX (8.28) ROW (3.29) ESP (4.81) THA (9.82)
Sector descriptions: Sector 9 – Rubber and plastics products, Sector 11 – Basic metals, Sector 14 – Com-
puter, electronic and optical equipment, Sector 15 – Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec, and Sector
16 – Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers.
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Table A.1: Key downstream trade partners of CPTPP members (2011) by formula (9)
JAPAN World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.50 9.75 25.27 34.77 50.29
1st downstream partner CHN (30.64) CHN (30.07) CHN (32.33) CHN (36.15) CHN (35.46)
2nd downstream partner KOR (11.10) USA (9.65) USA (16.93) KOR (11.36) USA (13.22)
3rd downstream partner USA (8.77) KOR (8.86) KOR (8.27) TWN (10.94) KOR (9.94)
4th downstream partner TWN (8.59) AUS (7.83) TWN (7.38) USA (6.63) TWN (9.48)
5th downstream partner THA (5.49) TWN (7.58) THA (4.76) MYS (6.01) MYS (4.87)
SINGAPORE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.44 23.60 33.35 35.88 45.63
1st downstream partner CHN (14.10) AUS (24.04) MYS (17.44) CHN (22.22) CHN (21.01)
2nd downstream partner MYS (10.92) MYS (21.79) USA (15.82) MYS (19.51) MYS (16.83)
3rd downstream partner IDN (7.15) JPN (15.30) AUS (15.57) AUS (16.95) AUS (12.46)
4th downstream partner USA (6.49) CHN (8.43) CHN (11.90) JPN (10.95) USA (12.34)
5th downstream partner AUS (6.23) VNM (4.82) JPN (10.33) KOR (3.70) JPN (8.37)
MALAYSIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.76 21.58 30.42 47.06 55.90
1st downstream partner CHN (30.17) JPN (23.62) CHN (24.21) CHN (44.70) CHN (40.34)
2nd downstream partner USA (7.87) CHN (19.08) USA (19.46) JPN (14.19) USA (13.53)
3rd downstream partner JPN (6.88) AUS (13.41) JPN (14.29) AUS (8.42) JPN (10.70)
4th downstream partner THA (5.63) SGP (10.73) AUS (7.81) SGP (6.89) AUS (6.12)
5th downstream partner ROW (5.23) THA (4.48) SGP (7.07) THA (3.78) SGP (5.57)
VIETNAM World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 22.55 37.81 36.39 51.65
1st downstream partner CHN (14.44) JPN (37.58) USA (29.34) JPN (26.88) USA (23.38)
2nd downstream partner USA (11.97) AUS (11.65) JPN (22.02) CHN (25.31) CHN (20.98)
3rd downstream partner JPN (10.05) MYS (10.86) CHN (11.28) MYS (9.85) JPN (18.47)
4th downstream partner KOR (7.19) CHN (9.69) MYS (7.42) AUS (9.73) MYS (7.51)
5th downstream partner MYS (5.80) CAN (4.59) AUS (6.91) KOR (5.56) AUS (6.69)
BRUNEI World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 59.83 61.95 64.38 66.51
1st downstream partner KOR (22.77) JPN (22.34) JPN (22.35) KOR (23.28) KOR (22.98)
2nd downstream partner JPN (19.73) AUS (20.79) KOR (20.85) AUS (23.26) JPN (21.32)
3rd downstream partner AUS (19.26) KOR (20.35) AUS (17.91) JPN (21.02) AUS (20.68)
4th downstream partner IDN (11.15) IDN (12.96) IDN (11.63) IDN (11.49) IDN (10.88)
5th downstream partner VNM (5.21) NZL (8.18) NZL (6.92) NZL (6.10) NZL (5.68)
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AUSTRALIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 26.37 31.75 53.18 58.56
1st downstream partner CHN (26.49) JPN (28.52) CHN (23.48) CHN (30.78) CHN (30.85)
2nd downstream partner KOR (14.12) CHN (19.06) JPN (21.41) JPN (21.01) JPN (17.92)
3rd downstream partner JPN (12.44) KOR (12.72) KOR (12.41) KOR (14.40) KOR (13.74)
4th downstream partner TWN (6.40) NZL (6.46) USA (6.38) TWN (6.83) TWN (6.67)
5th downstream partner IND (6.34) TWN (5.86) TWN (6.00) NZL (4.30) USA (4.74)
NEW ZEALAND World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.36 39.51 49.31 50.27 60.06
1st downstream partner AUS (25.04) AUS (51.39) AUS (38.78) AUS (44.68) AUS (36.23)
2nd downstream partner CHN (13.57) JPN (13.83) USA (13.34) CHN (16.72) CHN (16.76)
3rd downstream partner ROW (7.64) CHN (7.47) JPN (10.82) JPN (11.43) USA (10.92)
4th downstream partner USA (6.63) SGP (4.48) CHN (10.33) SGP (4.32) JPN (9.61)
5th downstream partner JPN (6.47) MYS (4.28) SGP (4.17) MYS (4.19) SGP (4.11)
CANADA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.87 7.30 74.05 12.19 78.93
1st downstream partner USA (56.69) USA (56.88) USA (75.47) USA (50.58) USA (71.13)
2nd downstream partner CHN (7.21) MEX (10.24) MEX (6.21) CHN (13.15) CHN (7.39)
3rd downstream partner MEX (3.78) JPN (8.57) CHN (4.41) MEX (8.00) MEX (5.70)
4th downstream partner GBR (3.52) CHN (6.18) JPN (3.27) JPN (7.35) JPN (3.29)
5th downstream partner KOR (2.93) KOR (2.75) KOR (1.52) KOR (3.99) KOR (2.14)
MEXICO World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.82 10.40 80.06 13.54 83.21
1st downstream partner USA (60.31) USA (45.36) USA (74.03) USA (43.97) USA (71.85)
2nd downstream partner CAN (11.00) CAN (32.14) CAN 15.53) CAN (27.30) CAN (14.88)
3rd downstream partner CHN (4.06) JPN (3.92) CHN (1.96) CHN (8.26) CHN (3.80)
4th downstream partner ROW (3.68) PER (3.13) JPN (1.32) JPN (3.64) JPN (1.38)
5th downstream partner ESP (2.23) CHN (3.04) PER (1.04) PER (2.73) PER (1.02)
CHILE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.05 18.80 29.11 42.52 52.83
1st downstream partner CHN (29.84) CHN (24.93) CHN (28.60) CHN (38.80) CHN (36.21)
2nd downstream partner KOR (7.82) JPN (22.96) USA (14.48) JPN (16.38) JPN (11.73)
3rd downstream partner USA (7.13) USA (7.49) JPN (13.71) KOR (8.14) USA (11.56)
4th downstream partner JPN (7.08) KOR (7.01) CAN (7.05) USA (5.58) KOR (7.15)
5th downstream partner BRA (4.92) MEX (5.63) MEX (6.54) TWN (4.76) CAN (5.60)
PERU World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 25.92 40.54 46.10 60.73
1st downstream partner CHN (17.76) CAN (19.31) CAN (28.88) CHN (23.47) CAN (24.76)
2nd downstream partner CAN (15.95) CHN (17.01) USA (15.97) CAN (15.06) CHN (18.78)
3rd downstream partner USA (9.35) CHL (13.29) CHN (14.78) KOR (13.49) USA (13.66)
4th downstream partner KOR (9.14) KOR (10.94) CHL (8.41) CHL (13.21) KOR (9.51)
5th downstream partner CHL (7.99) JPN (10.03) KOR (7.45) JPN (8.44) CHL (9.27)
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Table A.2: Key upstream trade partners of CPTPP members (2011) by formula (10)
JAPAN World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 15.37 28.07 36.72 49.43
1st upstream partner CHN (25.24) AUS (21.03) USA (21.25) CHN (37.27) CHN (32.12)
2nd upstream partner USA (8.66) CHN (19.84) CHN (19.90) AUS (12.80) USA (16.46)
3rd upstream partner KOR (8.46) USA (8.84) AUS (13.09) KOR (7.31) AUS (9.67)
4th upstream partner ROW (7.03) MYS (8.44) KOR (6.85) USA (7.26) KOR (6.59)
5th upstream partner AUS (4.84) KOR (8.31) MYS (5.88) MYS (6.01) MYS (4.94)
SINGAPORE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 16.22 29.29 24.46 37.52
1st upstream partner USA (11.43) JPN (34.82) USA (35.37) CHN (25.59) USA (28.62)
2nd upstream partner CHN (8.08) MYS (18.30) JPN (20.37) JPN (24.28) CHN (17.60)
3rd upstream partner ROW (7.94) AUS (12.21) MYS (11.39) MYS (13.78) JPN (16.41)
4th upstream partner JPN (6.65) CHN (4.41) AUS (7.24) AUS (8.55) MYS (9.84)
5th upstream partner IND(6.59) CAN (4.39) CHN (3.32) USA (3.75) AUS (5.85)
MALAYSIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 26.96 35.59 40.78 49.40
1st upstream partner CHN (14.56) JPN (32.24) JPN (23.27) CHN (26.91) CHN (22.29)
2nd upstream partner SGP (12.10) SGP (23.78) USA (20.52) JPN (23.34) JPN (18.56)
3rd upstream partner JPN (9.69) CHN (8.41) SGP (18.99) SGP (17.97) USA (16.25)
4th upstream partner USA (8.19) AUS (8.33) CHN (7.94) AUS (4.93) SGP (15.66)
5th upstream partner THA (6.34) VNM (5.17) AUS (6.05) THA (4.18) AUS (4.75)
VIETNAM World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 20.70 25.05 43.57 47.92
1st upstream partner CHN (24.32) JPN (21.56) CHN (17.57) CHN (38.34) CHN (35.07)
2nd upstream partner KOR (13.76) CHN (17.62) SGP (14.47) SGP (14.39) SGP (12.71)
3rd upstream partner TWN (10.02) KOR (10.42) KOR (10.49) KOR (9.20) KOR (9.44)
4th upstream partner THA (7.90) MYS (10.06) MYS (8.48) MYS (6.99) TWN (6.92)
5th upstream partner JPN (6.87) TWN (8.76) USA (8.37) TWN (6.97) MYS (6.39)
BRUNEI World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 41.71 62.03 49.35 69.67
1st upstream partner SGP (24.79) SGP (28.92) SGP (27.12) SGP (43.97) SGP (25.62)
2nd upstream partner MYS (18.07) MYS (27.58) USA (21.86) MYS (32.05) USA (20.19)
3rd upstream partner USA (14.05) JPN (12.33) MYS (21.13) CHN (11.35) MYS (19.88)
4th upstream partner CHN (6.40) USA (11.06) JPN (8.96) JPN (9.41) CHN (8.32)
5th upstream partner JPN (5.31) CHN (4.03) CHN (3.59) CAN (1.51) JPN (7.97)
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AUSTRALIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 23.57 37.34 39.03 52.80
1st upstream partner CHN (16.27) CHN (17.11) USA (18.02) CHN (23.07) CHN (20.58)
2nd upstream partner ROW (10.17) MYS (12.35) CHN (15.99) MYS (10.17) USA (16.08)
3rd upstream partner USA (8.82) JPN (10.20) MYS (9.16) USA (8.83) MYS (8.20)
4th upstream partner SGP (7.91) SGP (9.11) SGP (8.31) JPN (8.70) SGP (7.87)
5th upstream partner JPN (5.38) USA (9.03) JPN (7.72) SGP (8.28) JPN (7.12)
NEW ZEALAND World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 34.98 45.01 45.89 55.92
1st upstream partner AUS (24.79) AUS (38.30) AUS (30.93) AUS (32.74) AUS (27.84)
2nd upstream partner CHN (11.51) CHN (10.14) USA (12.92) CHN (15.69) CHN (14.38)
3rd upstream partner SGP (7.55) SGP (8.69) CHN (10.08) SGP (8.21) USA (11.92)
4th upstream partner ROW (7.19) MYS (7.20) SGP (8.23) MYS (6.45) SGP (7.94)
5th upstream partner USA (6.79) JPN (5.11) MYS (5.87) USA (5.36) MYS (5.51)
CANADA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 10.33 59.70 19.86 69.22
1st upstream partner USA (42.94) USA (31.95) USA (65.12) USA (32.25) USA (60.20)
2nd upstream partner CHN (10.72) MEX (16.89) MEX (9.82) CHN (21.54) CHN (11.3)
3rd upstream partner MEX (6.41) CHN (13.38) CHN (6.53) MEX (13.77) MEX (9.48)
4th upstream partner ROW (5.61) JPN (11.35) JPN (4.31) JPN (8.20) JPN (3.95)
5th upstream partner GBR (3.49) PER (7.03) PER (2.65) PER (4.84) PER (2.32)
MEXICO World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 10.72 62.20 23.49 74.96
1st upstream partner USA (43.18) USA (33.10) USA (64.98) CHN(36.05) USA (55.56)
2nd upstream partner CHN (18.16) JPN (17.75) CHN (9.25) USA (27.49) CHN (20.52)
3rd upstream partner DEU (4.50) CHN (17.66) JPN (7.35) JPN (11.51) JPN (6.24)
4th upstream partner KOR (4.29) CAN (9.79) CAN (5.94) CAN (6.51) CAN (5.02)
5th upstream partner JPN (4.25) MYS (4.06) KOR (2.12) KOR (3.63) KOR (2.35)
CHILE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 11.75 32.64 25.68 46.30
1st upstream partner USA (19.05) USA (21.48) USA (40.27) CHN (25.18) USA (35.17)
2nd upstream partner CHN (13.51) PER (20.55) PER (11.86) USA (18.54) CHN (18.36)
3rd upstream partner ROW (10.16) CHN (15.85) CHN (11.83) PER (15.16) PER (10.00)
4th upstream partner BRA (8.48) JPN (6.47) MEX (5.56) MEX (5.39) MEX (5.29)
5th upstream partner COL (5.20) MEX (5.92) CA (4.07) JPN (5.22) ROW (4.43)
PERU World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 14.71 34.19 30.45 49.92
1st upstream partner CHN (18.47) CHN (23.71) USA (34.36) CHN (29.34) USA (29.97)
2nd upstream partner USA (18.25) USA (21.34) CHN (17.02) USA (18.34) CHN (21.83)
3rd upstream partner ROW (10.15) MEX (14.90) MEX (14.15) MEX (12.76) MEX (12.96)
4th upstream partner MEX (7.07) CHL (5.88) CHL (4.12) KOR (5.45) KOR (4.23)
5th upstream partner BRA (5.11) KOR (5.28) KOR (3.84) CHL (4.49) CHL (3.59)
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